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iPreface 
A decision to withhold or withdraw medical treatment that will inevitably result in an 
adult’s death can be extremely difficult. In addition to making the appropriate medical 
and ethical judgments, there are also legal considerations to take into account, the 
most important of which is ensuring that the death is lawful. In Queensland, this area 
of law is governed by the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld).
At the time of their enactment, these pieces of legislation were regarded as very 
progressive. Preliminary research undertaken by the authors, however, revealed that 
those aspects of the legislation that govern decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining medical treatment were in need of review. Accordingly, the authors, 
together with Jennifer Abbey, a Professor in Nursing (Aged Care) in QUT’s School of 
Nursing, applied for and received a Special Projects Grant of $9,842.57 from the 
Faculty of Law at QUT to research this legislation.  Our collaborators in this special 
project are the Adult Guardian and Palliative Care Queensland. 
This project, entitled Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures, is funded by that Special 
Projects Grant. The goal of the project is to review the Queensland legislation that 
governs decisions to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment and 
suggest improvements.  The project focuses on this kind of decision specifically 
(rather than decisions about health matters more generally) because preliminary 
research indicated that the law that governs these decisions is, in some respects, 
problematic and in need of reform.  Some of the difficulties with the legislation that 
have been identified were apparent from examining the legislation itself.  Other issues 
were raised by those who participated at a public lecture entitled Lawful Withdrawal: 
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Care, which was hosted by the Law 
Faculty in association with QUT’s Faculty of Health, the Centre for Palliative Care 
Research and Education and Palliative Care Queensland on 7 July 2004. 
The Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures project has four stages. 
The first stage was the establishment of an Advisory Group. This group is a panel of 
multi-disciplinary experts with a wide range of relevant experience and its function is 
to assist in the project. Members of that group (in alphabetical order) are as follows: 
x Professor Jenny Abbey – Professor of Nursing (Aged Care), School of 
Nursing, QUT 
x Dr Colleen Cartwright – Foundation Professor of Aged Services, and Director 
of the Aged Services Learning and Research Collaboration, Southern Cross 
University, Coffs Harbour Education Campus 
x Dr Mark Deuble – Medical Director, Wesley Palliative Care Service and 
Canossa Palliative Care Unit 
i i
x Ms Sue Field – Senior Research Assistant, Centre for Elder Law, University of 
Western Sydney 
x Ms Bronwyn Jerrard – Principal Legal Consultant, Strategic Policy, 
Department of Justice and Attorney General 
x Ms Ann Lyons – President, Guardianship and Administration Tribunal 
x Associate Professor Mal Parker – Associate Professor of Medical Ethics, 
School of Medicine, University of Queensland
x Dr Arnel Polong – Medical Registrar, Gold Coast Hospital (nominated by 
Queensland Health) 
x Ms Paula Scully – Adult Guardian 
x Dr Cameron Stewart – Senior Lecturer in Law, Division of Law, Macquarie 
University
The second stage of this project was the production of this document: an Issues Paper 
entitled Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions for Queensland. The goal of 
this paper is to identify difficulties with the law that governs withholding or 
withdrawing this sort of medical treatment and seek views as to how it could be 
improved.  
The third stage of this project is a period of consultation. We hope that the Issues 
Paper will generate debate and prompt those with an interest to make a comment or a 
submission. We are specifically seeking a wide range of views with copies of the 
paper being circulated to a broad group of stakeholders including doctors, nurses, 
lawyers, interest groups, government bodies and members of the general public.  
The fourth and final stage involves considering the comments and submissions 
received and then writing a research report. That report will make recommendations 
as to how the law should be improved and will be submitted to the Government, and 
in particular to the Department of Justice and Attorney-General and Queensland 
Health. It is anticipated that this report will be completed towards the end of 2005. 
We have had assistance in writing this Issues Paper for which we are very grateful. 
The Advisory Group provided valuable practical insight into the matters raised in this 
document and gave detailed input into previous drafts.  
We are also grateful to Mr Jim Cockerill, the former Adult Guardian, for his 
contribution to the project. We also appreciate the contribution of our research 
assistant, Mr Simon Quinn and the assistance of Ms Chris Fyfe in preparing this 
document for publication. 
The views expressed in this Issues Paper are those of the authors and are not 
necessarily shared by those with whom we consulted in preparing this document. In 
addition, we note that any errors are solely our responsibility.
i i i
Finally, we thank the Faculty of Law at QUT for making a grant available to fund this 
project.
If you would like more information about the Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures
project, please visit its website at: 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/
Ben White           February 2005 
Lindy Willmott 
Faculty of Law, QUT 
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Glossary
This Glossary contains a number of terms referred to in the Issues Paper that might 
not be commonly used, or might have a particular legal meaning in this area of law. In 
the case of those terms drawn specifically from the legislation, the relevant sections 
that apply are footnoted in case further detail is required. We thank the non legal 
members of our Advisory Group for their contributions to the medical and nursing 
terms included in this list. 
Adult Guardian A statutory officer whose position is established by the GAA.1
The Adult Guardian’s role is to protect the rights and interests 
of adults who have impaired capacity including: 
x investigating allegations of neglect, exploitation and 
abuse of such adults;
x acting as a guardian or personal attorney of last resort; 
x acting as a statutory health attorney of last resort; and  
x conducting research and providing education in 
relation to the operation of the PAA and GAA.
Advance health 
directive
(“AHD”)
A formal document through which an adult may give 
directions about their future health care (both health matters 
and special health matters) and may appoint one or more 
people (an attorney or attorneys) to make decisions on their 
behalf if the directions prove inadequate.  An AHD may 
include directions requiring that life-sustaining measures be 
withheld or withdrawn.2
Artificial 
nutrition and 
hydration
The provision of nutrients and hydrating fluid, such as water 
or normal saline, through a tube if a person is incapable of 
eating food and drinking water normally. This is regarded as a 
form of medical treatment and it is usually a life-sustaining 
measure. 
Assisted
ventilation
The process of supporting breathing by manual or mechanical 
means when normal breathing has stopped or is inefficient. It 
involves the forcing of air or other gases in or about the 
airway to assist with the movement of that air or other gases 
in the lungs. 
                                           
1  The position was originally established by the PAA, ch 7 in 1998.  However, this chapter was later 
repealed and the provisions relevant to the Adult Guardian now appear in the GAA, ch 8. 
2  The operation of advance health directives is explained in the PAA, ch 3 pt 3.  
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Capacity The ability to make your own decisions, including decisions 
about your own health care.  Under the PAA and GAA,
“capacity” requires that an adult must be capable of: 
x understanding the nature and effect of decisions about 
a matter;  
x freely and voluntarily making decisions about that 
matter; and  
x communicating those decisions in some way.3
Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation 
(“CPR”)
A procedure designed to restore normal breathing and cardiac 
function after a cardiac arrest. It includes clearing the air 
passages to the lungs, mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration, 
and heart massage by external pressure on the chest.
Common law The set of rules made by judges – as opposed to Parliament – 
to decide cases. Australia’s common law derives historically 
from the common law of England, which is one reason why 
English decisions have particular relevance in Queensland.  
Parliament may override the common law on a particular 
topic by legislation, if it chooses to do so. Unlike legislation, 
there is no single or simple source for accessing or 
determining the common law. 
Consent Consent has its ordinary meaning. To have legal effect, a 
person’s consent must be given freely and voluntarily so, for 
example, it must not be given because of another person’s 
pressure or coercion. Consent may be implied by a person’s 
conduct. In some circumstances, consent requires particular 
legal formalities (for example, the completion of a valid 
advance health directive). 
Criminal law Broadly, the body of law prohibiting those activities that are 
considered so serious that the State itself has an interest in 
their prohibition. Importantly, the criminal law includes 
actions (and sometimes a failure to act when you should) even 
if the person is not motivated by ill will. For example, 
continuing to provide medical treatment without consent 
(even if a person needs it) can amount to the criminal offence 
of assault under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). 
Fraud Intentional deception. 
Futile treatment This term can be used by different people to mean different 
things. As noted in Issue 11, the precise determination of the 
meaning of “futile treatment” is beyond the scope of this 
Issues Paper. However, a common formulation sometimes 
adopted in this area of law is that treatment is futile when it is 
                                           
3 PAA, sch 3; GAA, sch 4. 
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no longer providing a benefit to a patient, or the burdens of 
providing the treatment outweigh the benefits. 
GAA The Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). It, 
along with the PAA, is the legislation that governs this area of 
law. A copy of this Act is available at: 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/others.jsp
General
principles (“GP”)
A series of principles underpinning the operation of the PAA
and the GAA, set out in virtually identical terms in both Acts.4
The principles emphasise, among other points, that adults are 
presumed to have capacity, that all adults have equal human 
rights and that all adults should be encouraged to be self-
reliant and to participate in the life of the community. The 
legislation requires people making decisions for adults with 
impaired capacity to use these principles. 
Good faith Though often used in law, “good faith” has no special 
meaning distinct from its general social use. 
Good medical 
practice
Good medical practice for the medical profession in Australia, 
having regard to the recognised medical standards, practices 
and procedures and recognised ethical standards of the 
medical profession in Australia.5 The meaning of “good 
medical practice” is considered in Issue 8 of this paper. 
Guardianship
and
Administration 
Tribunal
(“GAAT” or “the 
Tribunal”)
A Tribunal established by the GAA to deal with a range of 
issues arising under the PAA and GAA.6 The Tribunal’s 
functions include:
x making declarations as to capacity; 
x appointing guardians and administrators; and 
x consenting to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures for adults with impaired capacity. 
Health care Care, treatment or a service or procedure to diagnose, 
maintain, or treat an adult’s physical or mental condition, 
which is carried out by a health provider, or carried out under 
their direction or supervision.7 It includes withholding or 
withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure if the commencement 
or continuation of the treatment would be inconsistent with 
good medical practice. The definition excludes some very 
minor treatment such as administering first aid. Problems with 
the definition of “health care” are discussed in Issue 12. 
                                           
4 PAA, sch 1 pt 1; GAA, sch 1 pt 1. 
5 PAA, sch 2 s 5B; GAA, sch 2 s 5B. 
6 GAA, ch 6. 
7 PAA, sch 2 s 5; GAA, sch 2 s 5. 
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Health care 
principle
(“HCP”)
The principle that decisions about a health matter (or special 
health matter) should be made in a way that is least restrictive 
of an adult’s rights and only exercised if it is necessary and 
appropriate for the adult’s health and wellbeing, or is, in all 
the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests. This is an 
important principle underpinning the operation of the PAA
and GAA and must be used by people making decisions about 
the health care of adults with impaired capacity. It is set out in 
virtually identical terms in both Acts.8
Health matter Any matter relating to health care, except matters relating to 
special health care.9
Health provider Any person who provides health care (or special health care) 
in the practice of a profession or in the ordinary course of 
business.10  For example, doctors, nurses and dentists are all 
“health providers”. 
Legislation Formal enactments of Parliament, setting out the law on a 
particular matter.  Legislation will override the common law 
on a particular issue, if Parliament intends it to do so. The 
legislation being considered in this project (the PAA and 
GAA) can be accessed at: 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/others.jsp
Life-sustaining 
measure
Health care that is intended to sustain or prolong life and that 
supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily functions 
that are temporarily or permanently incapable of independent 
operation.11 It includes cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
assisted ventilation and artificial nutrition and hydration. 
Mediation Any means of bringing parties together to seek a mutually 
agreed settlement to a dispute. 
Necessity
(doctrine of) 
A legal principle, which in the medical context, allows a 
medical practitioner to provide treatment without consent 
because it is necessary to do so.  The doctrine of necessity 
does not permit a medical practitioner to treat a patient 
contrary to that patient’s expressed wishes, nor to provide 
treatment that is not reasonable in the circumstances.  
Similarly, the doctrine (which is part of the common law) 
does not override any legislative requirements. 
                                           
8 PAA, sch 1 pt 2; GAA, sch 1 pt 2. 
9 PAA, sch 2 s 4; GAA, sch 2 s 4. 
10 PAA, sch 3; GAA, sch 4. 
11 PAA, sch 2 s 5A; GAA, sch 2 s 5A. 
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PAA The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld). It, along with the 
GAA, is the legislation that governs this area of law. A copy of 
this Act is available at: 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/others.jsp
Parens patriae 
jurisdiction
The Supreme Court’s power to make a decision on behalf of 
those people who are incapable of making that decision 
themselves. This includes the power to consent to the 
provision or withdrawal of medical treatment on behalf of 
children, unconscious patients and those whose capacity is 
sufficiently impaired that they cannot make the relevant 
decision themselves. 
Percutaneous
endoscopic
gastrostomy 
(“PEG” or “PEG 
tube”)
A tube placed through the skin into the stomach. This may be 
inserted to enable the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration when people are unable to eat normally.
Persistent
vegetative state 
A condition where the upper part of the brain, which controls 
the more sophisticated functions such as speech, movement 
and thought, has died.  The lower part of the brain (the brain 
stem) is still functioning and so breathing can continue 
normally without support. People in a persistent vegetative 
state do not have any awareness of their surroundings and are 
unable to make any voluntary movements. The use of the 
word “persistent” indicates that recovery is extremely 
unlikely.
Personal matter A matter relating to an adult’s care, except for any matter that 
is a special personal matter or a special health matter.  
Personal matters include: 
x where and with whom an adult lives; 
x what education, training or work an adult performs;
x day-to-day issues (including diet and dress); and
x the health care of the adult.12
Reasonable care 
and skill 
The care and skill that would be provided by a reasonable 
person in the circumstances. Reasonableness essentially 
cannot be further defined, because it must depend upon all the 
circumstances of a case. 
                                           
12 PAA, sch 2 s 2; GAA, sch 2 s 2. 
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Special health 
care
Health care that is particularly serious, and so can only be 
consented to by the adult themselves through an advance 
health directive, or by the Tribunal.13  The PAA and GAA set 
out six types of “special health care”: 
x removal of tissue for donation while the adult is alive; 
x sterilisation of the adult; 
x termination of a pregnancy;  
x participation by the adult in special medical research 
or experimental health care; 
x electroconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery; and 
x any other prescribed special health care.14
Special health 
matter
A matter relating to special health care.15
Special personal 
matter
Personal matters that are particularly serious, and so require 
the consent of the particular adult in question.  The PAA and 
GAA set out five “special personal matters”: 
x making or revoking a will; 
x making or revoking a power of attorney, enduring 
power of attorney or an advance health directive;
x voting in a government election or referendum;  
x consenting to adopt a child; and
x consenting to marriage.16
Statutory The term “statutory” means relating to legislation. Hence, 
statutory rights are rights created under legislation and 
statutory duties are duties imposed by legislation. 
Statutory health 
attorney
A person who is empowered by the PAA and GAA in certain 
circumstances to make decisions about an adult’s health care 
that the adult could lawfully make if that adult had capacity.  
A “statutory health attorney” is the first of the following who 
is readily available and culturally appropriate:  
x the patient’s spouse, if the relationship is close and 
continuing;
x an unpaid adult carer of the patient; 
x a close adult friend or relation of the patient who is not 
a paid carer; and 
x the Adult Guardian as a last resort.17
                                           
13  Although note that the Tribunal may not consent to electroconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery: 
GAA, s 68. 
14 PAA, sch 2 s 7; GAA, sch 2 s 7. 
15 PAA, sch 2 s 6; GAA, sch 2 s 6. 
16 PAA, sch 2 s 3; GAA, sch 2 s 3. 
17   PAA, ch 4 and particularly s 63. 
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Part 1 – Overview 
Many members of our community are unable to make some, or even any, decisions 
about their lives because they lack the capacity to do so.  A statutory framework has 
been established in Queensland to facilitate decision making for adults with impaired 
capacity to ensure that decisions that need to be made, can be made.  That framework 
is comprised of two statutes – 
x the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (the “PAA”); and
x the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (the “GAA”).
These statutes were enacted after the Queensland Law Reform Commission carried 
out a detailed investigation during the 1990s.  The Commission reviewed the existing 
laws and carried out an exhaustive consultation process with a wide range of 
individuals and groups. Those consulted included people who need assistance with 
decision making, individuals caring for those people, peak interest groups, health 
professionals, relevant government bodies and those holding statutory positions.  The 
legislation that was ultimately enacted is based largely on the Commission’s 
recommendations.  The publications that the Commission produced in the course of 
its review are therefore instructive as to the reasons for enacting various provisions 
and how the regime operates as an integrated whole.  The relevant Commission 
publications are – 
x Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by and for people with a 
decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996); 
x Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by and for people with a 
decision-making disability, Draft Report No WP43 (1995); 
x Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making for People who Need 
Assistance Because of Mental or Intellectual Disability, Discussion Paper No 
WP38 (1992);
x Steering Your Own Ship?, Issues Paper No MP1 (1991). 
The PAA and GAA set out a decision making regime that divides decisions into two 
types of matters: “financial matters” and “personal matters”.  The provisions relating 
to financial matters facilitate someone being able to take care of the financial affairs 
of an adult or those aspects of an adult’s financial affairs that he or she no longer has 
capacity to carry out for him or herself. A decision about “personal matters” can also 
be made on an adult’s behalf, and this sort of decision includes where and with whom 
the adult lives, the nature of work that the adult undertakes, the adult’s diet and dress 
and the health care of the adult. 
This project focuses on one aspect of an adult’s health care (which is a personal 
matter), namely decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures.  
The meaning of the term “life-sustaining measure” is considered in more detail in the 
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next part of this Issues Paper but, as the term suggests, it refers to treatment without 
which an adult may die.  Because of the seriousness of such a decision, the legislation 
imposes additional safeguards that must be met before that treatment can be withheld 
or withdrawn.  These provisions will be considered in some detail throughout this 
Issues Paper. 
Part 2 of the Issues Paper provides a broad overview of the law that governs these 
kinds of decisions in Queensland.  There are two sources of law that are relevant here 
and the first is the common law and, in particular, the power of the Supreme Court to 
make decisions to protect individuals who do not have capacity to make decisions on 
their own behalf.  The second source of law is the statutory regime that consists of the 
PAA and GAA.
Part 3 then focuses on 14 issues arising out of the statutory regime that warrant further 
consideration.  An issue might raise an ambiguity in the legislation, a lack of clarity or 
inconsistency in the law, or some matter of policy that may be worth considering.   
Part 3 is divided into four sections.  The first deals with issues arising in relation to 
advance health directives, which are directions about health care that are made by an 
adult before he or she loses capacity to make a particular decision.  The second 
section deals with a variety of issues that are relevant when someone else is making 
the decision on behalf of an adult.  The third section contains only one issue and this 
is how the PAA and GAA interact with particular provisions in the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld). The final section summarises the reform questions posed throughout the 
document into a comprehensive list. 
In examining each of these 14 issues, a similar approach is employed.  First, the 
problem is outlined, and a hypothetical case study is given to illustrate the particular 
difficulty. Next, how that issue is resolved under the legislation is examined (often 
with a comparison of the common law), and generally some reform options that might 
be available are canvassed.  Each issue concludes with one or more questions for 
consideration by the reader. 
Before turning to the substantive part of the Issues Paper, the issue of terminology 
should be mentioned. The terms used in this paper will generally mirror those used in 
the legislation. At times this can be cumbersome because the legislation sometimes 
employs terms that are not ordinarily used. One example is that the PAA and GAA
refer to “health providers” rather than health professionals or some other less formal 
term. Another example is “life-sustaining measures” rather than life support or life 
saving medical treatment. Although the definitions in the legislation may be a little 
cumbersome at times, for reasons of consistency, this Issues Paper will mirror the 
terminology of the PAA and GAA.
A second point is to note the inclusion of a Glossary at the beginning of this 
document. We are hopeful that the Issues Paper will be read by a broad group of 
stakeholders including doctors, nurses, lawyers, interest groups, government bodies 
and members of the general public. Because people have varying levels of 
understanding of the legal, medical and nursing terminology that is used in this area, 
we have included a Glossary to try and explain what some of these commonly used 
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terms mean. We are particularly grateful to the non legal members of our Advisory 
Group for their contributions to the medical and nursing terms in the Glossary. 
A third point is to draw attention to the fact that the discussion to date has only been 
in relation to adults with impaired capacity, and not children. This is because 
decisions under the PAA and GAA to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures 
apply only to adults.18 The scope of this project is similarly focused and will not 
consider how these decisions are made in relation to children. 
We welcome any comments or submissions you may have on this Issues Paper. The 
details as to how to make your views known are located at the front of this document. 
If you are interested, some resources are available at the Rethinking Life-Sustaining 
Measures website that may assist in making a comment or submission on this Issues 
Paper. There are links to the legislation being considered and some of the key cases in 
the area as well as a range of other information about the project. The address of the 
website is: 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/
                                           
18  Note, however, recent amendments to the GAA which also grant the Guardianship and 
Administration Tribunal jurisdiction in relation to the sterilisation of children with impaired 
capacity: GAA, ch 5A. 
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Part 2 – Law in Queensland 
Introduction 
A decision to withhold or withdraw medical treatment that will inevitably lead to an 
adult’s death can raise complex legal considerations. If an adult has the capacity to 
make the decision him or herself, the law is clear. A competent adult may refuse 
treatment even if that results in his or her death.19 Indeed, if that adult continues to be 
treated against clearly stated wishes, medical staff will be committing an assault and 
can be liable to civil or criminal prosecution.20
However, if an adult lacks the capacity to make such a decision, the law becomes 
more complex. In Queensland, both the common law and legislation may be relevant. 
The two pieces of legislation that apply in this area, the PAA and GAA, create a legal 
framework for how such decisions are made.  However, these statutes expressly state 
that the inherent jurisdiction of the Queensland Supreme Court is not affected by their 
enactment.21 This means that if guidance or a determination is needed regarding a 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, a person may pursue this 
either through the legislation (and possibly the Guardianship and Administration 
Tribunal) or by relying on the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (and, in 
particular, its parens patriae jurisdiction). 
The statutory regime in Queensland 
Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures can be made under the 
PAA and GAA. The commentary that follows examines three matters that must be 
considered before such a decision can be made:  
x whether the relevant medical treatment is a “life-sustaining measure”;  
x who can make a decision to withhold or withdraw this treatment; and 
x whether such a decision should be made.22
                                           
19 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449.
20 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 246. 
21 PAA, s 109; GAA, s 240. 
22  Part 3 of the Issues Paper identifies some potential difficulties with the legislation that may mean 
that the relevant law is unclear or unnecessarily complicated, or even that the legislation directs 
particular results that could not have been intended by Parliament. The discussion of the law in this 
part, however, will not consider these difficulties, but will address what is probably intended to be 
the law. 
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Life-sustaining measures 
The legislation deals with life-sustaining measures differently from other medical 
treatment, usually imposing additional safeguards before this sort of treatment can be 
withheld or withdrawn. No doubt this is for policy reasons given the serious 
implications of such a decision. 
A “life-sustaining measure” is defined in the PAA and GAA as follows:23
 5A Life-sustaining measure 
(1) A “life-sustaining measure” is health care intended to sustain or prolong life and that 
supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily functions that are temporarily or 
permanently incapable of independent operation. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), each of the following is a “life-sustaining measure”— 
(a) cardiopulmonary resuscitation; 
(b) assisted ventilation; 
(c) artificial nutrition and hydration. 
(3) A blood transfusion is not a “life-sustaining measure”. 
It may be argued that some other treatment or care that could be needed to keep an 
adult alive may not fall within the above definition. One such example may be the 
hand feeding of patients who are capable of swallowing but not feeding themselves. 
There are some legal arguments that would see it included as a life-sustaining 
measure, and there are others that suggest it falls outside the definition. If the latter is 
correct, the law treats that sort of treatment or care differently and different legislative 
provisions would apply. This is discussed further in Part 3, Issue 13. 
Who decides? 
If an adult lacks the capacity needed to make a decision to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures, then some other decision making mechanism is required. The 
legislation regards this kind of decision as being one about “health care”,24 and sets 
out a list of potential decision making mechanisms with the first to apply taking 
priority:25
1. The first is an advance health directive completed by the adult. This is the 
adult making his or her own decision prior to losing capacity, and that decision 
then being enforced at a later date when the adult is no longer able to decide 
for him or herself. 
2. The second potential decision making mechanism is a guardian appointed by 
the Tribunal to make a decision, or an order that the Tribunal makes on the 
subject.
                                           
23 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5A. 
24 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5(2). Note, however, that to constitute health care within the definition, the 
commencement or continuation of the treatment must be inconsistent with good medical practice. 
Some difficulties that arise from this definition are discussed in Part 3, Issue 12. 
25 GAA, s 66. 
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3. The third potential decision making mechanism is an attorney appointed under 
an enduring power of attorney or under an advance health directive. 
4. The fourth and final mechanism, if none of the previous ones apply, is that the 
decision is made by a “statutory health attorney”. This is another term that is 
defined in the PAA26 and again a priority list is used with the statutory health 
attorney being the first person in the list who is “readily available and 
culturally appropriate” to make the decision: 
x The first possible statutory health attorney is the spouse of the adult, 
provided that the relationship is close and continuing. It is important to 
note that “spouse” will include de facto partners (both heterosexual and 
same sex partnerships).27
x If such a spouse is not available, the next potential statutory health attorney 
is the adult’s carer, provided the person is eighteen years or over and is not 
a paid carer of the adult. The definition of a “paid carer” is important 
because it specifically excludes those who receive a State or 
Commonwealth carer payment or other similar benefit, or who are funded 
from compensation awarded due to the adult with impaired capacity being 
injured through negligence.28 Accordingly, a person providing care in 
those circumstances is not regarded as a paid carer and so is still eligible to 
be the adult’s statutory health attorney. 
x If the adult does not have a carer, the third option is a close friend or 
relation of the adult who, again, must be eighteen or over and must also 
not be a paid carer. 
x A final option, if an adult has none of these people available to him or her, 
is that the Adult Guardian will act as the statutory health attorney. The 
Adult Guardian is a position established by the statutory regime29 and that 
person is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights and 
interests of adults with impaired capacity.30 The rationale in making the 
Adult Guardian a decision maker of last resort is that there will always be 
someone who can make this decision. 
The legislation is clear in setting out how or from whom consent is to be obtained. As 
we have discussed, it sets out a hierarchy of decision making mechanisms and, for the 
last of these mechanisms, the statutory health attorney, it sets out a further prioritised 
list of people who are empowered to act in this role. However, despite this 
comprehensive approach, problems can arise. 
A classic situation is where there are two or more eligible statutory health attorneys 
who disagree about how an adult should be treated. This might occur, for example, if 
there is more than one “relation” who would qualify as a statutory health attorney for 
                                           
26 PAA, s 63. 
27 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32DA. 
28 PAA, sch 3; GAA, sch 4. 
29  The position was originally established by the PAA, ch 7 in 1998.  However, this chapter was later 
repealed and the provisions relevant to the Adult Guardian now appear in the GAA, ch 8. 
30 GAA, s 174. 
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the adult. In a situation such as this, the Adult Guardian may become involved, first 
through mediation.31 There will be attempts made to resolve the dispute in this way, 
although if this is unsuccessful, the Adult Guardian is also empowered to make the 
decision on behalf of the adult him or herself.32 Less common is when people are 
behaving in a way inconsistent with the principles set out in the legislation (see later 
in this Part). If a decision is being made (or not made) for another that is contrary to 
the health care principle, the Adult Guardian is also entitled to intervene and make (or 
not make) the decision.33 These problems may also be resolved before the Tribunal, 
which is empowered to hear applications seeking a declaration, order, direction, 
recommendation or advice in relation to a matter involving an adult under the PAA
and the GAA.34
Whether to withhold or withdraw 
The legislation guides decision making for all kinds of medical treatment including 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures. The law treats decisions 
made in advance health directives (where the decision is made by the adult through 
this document) differently from decisions made by substituted decision makers 
(whether they are individuals close to the adult, the Adult Guardian or the Tribunal). 
These different decision making paths will be considered separately. 
Advance health directives 
Advance health directives are legally binding documents and must be followed.35 A 
failure to comply with a lawful request in a directive can result in both criminal and 
civil actions being brought against the relevant health provider for assault. There are, 
however, particular conditions that must be met if the direction is one to withhold or 
withdraw a life-sustaining measure. 
The PAA provides that such a direction cannot operate unless two or three conditions 
are met, depending on the circumstances.36 The first condition is that the adult’s 
health must be sufficiently poor and the legislation requires the adult to fall within one 
of four categories. The adult must: 
x have a terminal illness (or a condition that is incurable or irreversible) from 
which the adult is expected to die within a year; 
x be in a persistent vegetative state; 
x be permanently unconscious; or 
x have an illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect 
that the adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining measures will not be 
needed.
                                           
31 GAA, s 42. 
32 GAA, s 42. 
33 GAA, s 43. 
34 GAA, s 115. The Tribunal also has the specific power to consent to the withholding or withdrawal 
of a life-sustaining measure: GAA, s 82(1)(f). 
35  An advance health directive must, however, satisfy the formal requirements for completion as set 
out in the PAA: ch 3 pt 4. 
36 PAA, s 36(2). 
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The second condition is that the advance health directive can only apply if the adult 
has no reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make decisions about 
his or her health. 
The third condition applies only if the advance health directive is being relied upon to 
not provide artificial nutrition and hydration. In these circumstances, the directive will 
only operate if the commencement or continuation of this treatment would be 
inconsistent with good medical practice. 
If these two conditions (or three if it relates to artificial nutrition and hydration) are 
satisfied, the advance health directive is legally binding and must be followed. By 
contrast to when consent is given by another, there is no requirement to consider tests 
such as the best interests of the adult or whether the treatment is the option that is the 
least restrictive of his or her rights (see below). The adult is making the decision for 
him or herself (through an advance health directive) and so is entitled to refuse life-
sustaining measures. 
Consent from another 
The law is more complex if an advance health directive is not being relied upon, and 
instead consent is being given by another person, such as a statutory health attorney. 
The PAA and the GAA do provide guidance, however, for the people who are making 
these decisions on behalf of another. Schedule 1 in both Acts sets out a number of 
principles that must inform these sorts of decisions. They are separated into the 
“general principles” and the “health care principle”. The general principles apply to 
all decisions made under the legislation, of which withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining measures is just one, and so are necessarily broad. The health care principle 
is to be used for health related decisions only, which obviously includes the sorts of 
decisions being discussed. 
The principles that are likely to be particularly relevant to a decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures will require consideration of:37
x the adult’s views and wishes, if they are known;38
x whether the decision is “least restrictive of the adult’s rights”;39
x what is in the adult’s best interests;40 and 
x the adult’s dignity.41
The decisions made, guided by these principles, will depend heavily on the 
circumstances of each case, and particularly the condition of the patient. In a recent 
decision of the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal, Re MC,42 the Tribunal 
                                           
37  The principles that may be relevant to this kind of decision are considered in more detail in Part 3, 
Issue 10.
38 PAA and GAA, sch 1 GP 7. 
39 PAA and GAA, sch 1 HCP 12(1)(a). 
40 PAA and GAA, sch 1 HCP 12(1)(b)(ii). 
41 PAA and GAA, sch 1 GP 3. 
42  [2003] QGAAT 13. 
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referred to all of these principles but seemed to place considerable emphasis on the 
invasive nature of the treatment (or whether the treatment would be least restrictive of 
Mrs C’s rights), a consideration of what Mrs C would have wanted and what would be 
in Mrs C’s best interests. 
Having weighed the principles and considered the situation of the adult, the legislation 
contains one further safeguard before life-sustaining measures can be withheld or 
withdrawn. That safeguard is that the consent to withhold or withdraw the life-
sustaining measure given on behalf of the adult cannot operate unless the adult’s 
health provider reasonably considers that the commencement or continuation of the 
measure is inconsistent with “good medical practice”.43 “Good medical practice” is 
defined in the legislation by reference to recognised medical standards, practices and 
procedures of the medical profession in Australia, as well as recognised ethical 
standards.44
Conclusion
Medical treatment needed to keep a patient alive is different from other care, and so 
the PAA and the GAA treat it differently. First, the treatment must fall within the 
definition of a “life-sustaining measure”. The legislation then sets out a framework to 
identify the appropriate decision making mechanism. The list begins with the adult 
making these decisions him or herself in an advance health directive. The final 
mechanism is a statutory health attorney, usually a family member or friend, who is 
not specifically appointed by the adult but empowered to act by law. In any given 
case, the first in this list of mechanisms that is available will apply. 
Then the legislation sets out how these decisions are to be made. In the case of an 
advance health directive, certain conditions must be met, most notably that the adult 
must have a sufficiently serious medical condition and there must be no reasonable 
prospect that he or she will regain capacity to make these decisions. If those 
conditions are met, that advance health directive is binding and health providers must 
follow all lawful directions.
Where another is making a decision for the adult, the legislation prescribes two steps. 
The first is that the person empowered to decide consents to the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining measures based on criteria set out in the legislation. But 
that consent alone cannot operate because of an additional safeguard: the continuation 
or commencement of the medical treatment must be inconsistent with good medical 
practice.
The common law 
The common law also permits the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
measures in appropriate circumstances and, from a Queensland perspective, is worth 
discussing for a number of reasons. The first reason is that some of the common law 
                                           
43 GAA, s 66A. 
44 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5B. The meaning of good medical practice is considered in more detail in 
Part 3, Issue 8. 
17 Rethinking Li fe-Sustaining Measures
has specifically been left intact in Queensland by the PAA and GAA. The Supreme 
Court retains its power to make decisions for those with impaired decision making 
capacity under its parens patriae jurisdiction.45 Secondly, the common law has been 
relied upon when making decisions under Queensland’s legislative regime. For 
example, the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal has referred extensively to 
the common law cases when considering whether to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures under the Acts.46 A final reason to consider the common law is 
that it provides a useful starting point from which to assess the reforms enacted by the 
PAA and GAA. In Part 3, the issues identified as potentially in need of reform are 
often compared with the previous common law position.
At common law, there are two considerations that are relevant to decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures: who makes the decision and upon 
what criteria.47 These two issues are dealt with in turn. 
Decision maker 
At common law, there are two potential decision makers: the doctor who is treating 
the adult, and the courts. 
Generally at common law, a health provider cannot administer health care without the 
patient’s consent. However, a complication arises in relation to adults with impaired 
capacity, as they are unable to make such a decision. To ensure that these adults 
receive necessary treatment, the courts have said that medical treatment that an adult 
needs can be given without consent, based on the doctrine of necessity.48 This 
doctrine does not justify the administration of all treatment; only that which is in the 
adult’s best interests.49 This will include treatment that is administered in an 
emergency context, but also non urgent treatment provided that treatment is in the 
adult’s best interests. The courts have said that this doctrine specifically applies to 
decisions to refuse life-sustaining measures.50 Accordingly, if a patient’s best interests 
require that treatment not be provided, then consent is not needed for a patient’s 
treating doctor to make a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures. 
The second decision maker, the courts, is empowered to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures under its parens patriae jurisdiction. This jurisdiction entitles the 
                                           
45 PAA, s 109; GAA, s 240. 
46 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, [57]-[63]; Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1, [154]-[156], [158]; Re RWG 
[2000] QGAAT 2 [51]-[55], [60]-[75], [87]. 
47  The common law also encompasses declaratory relief that may be granted by the Supreme Court. 
In the current context, for example, the Court may be asked by a health provider to declare that the 
proposed withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures is lawful.  See, for example, 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 and Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General 
[1993] 1 NZLR 235. This approach may be appropriate where the reason for the Court being 
involved is that a health provider is worried about their potential legal liability in stopping or not 
providing medical treatment. In this situation, the Court is not making the decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures, instead it is ruling on its lawfulness. 
48 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
49 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. See below for a discussion of the best 
interests test. 
50 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 866 (Lord Goff), 883 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 892 
(Lord Mustill) all citing In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
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courts to give consent to medical treatment (among other things) on behalf of people 
who are incapable of doing so for themselves.51  Because the Court’s order is to give 
consent, the effect of such a decision is that the withholding or withdrawal of the 
treatment takes place with the consent of the adult.52
Although it is clear that a court ruling will prevail over a decision made by an adult’s 
treating doctor, the courts have said that a decision to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures is primarily a medical decision at first instance.53 In most 
common law jurisdictions, the courts need only be involved if there is a dispute as to 
the treating doctor’s assessment of a patient’s condition, or if the doctor wishes to 
seek direction from the courts.54
It was noted above that in Queensland, some aspects of the common law have been 
preserved by the PAA and GAA. In particular, the Supreme Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction, and specifically its parens patriae jurisdiction, was expressly protected.55
However, although Queensland’s Supreme Court has retained its jurisdiction, the 
power that doctors had at common law to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
measures has not survived the PAA and GAA. As was discussed above, the legal 
ground for this power was the doctrine of necessity, which was based on the inability 
of an adult with impaired capacity to give consent. The reason why a doctor is not 
permitted to rely on this reasoning in Queensland (and hence make a decision without 
consent) is that the PAA and GAA create a mechanism through which it is nearly 
always possible to obtain consent (albeit through other people).56 Accordingly, the 
issue of necessity does not arise. 
Criterion of best interests 
The relevant criterion in deciding the appropriate medical treatment for an adult who 
lacks capacity is whether such treatment is in the patient’s best interests.57 The best 
                                           
51 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; Department of Health and Community 
Services (NT) v JWB (1992) 175 CLR 218; Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service
(2000) 50 NSWLR 549, 552-554. 
52 Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201, 212. 
53 Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549,554; Isaac Messiha (by 
his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061, [25]. 
54  Compare the common law of England where decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
measures from some patients who lack capacity must be approved by the English High Court: 
Practice Note: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and Welfare Decisions for Adults who lack 
Capacity [2001] 2 FLR 158.
55 PAA, s 109; GAA, s 240. 
56  However, the legislation recognises that life-sustaining measures may be withheld or withdrawn 
without consent in an acute emergency in certain circumstances: GAA, s 63A. See also other 
provisions in the GAA that deal with health care without consent: s 63 (urgent health care) and s 64 
(uncontroversial health care). 
57  Note that the appropriateness of the best interests test to this area of law has been questioned. For 
example, the test has been criticised by those who consider that the Bland decision (see below) 
represents the first dangerous step on the slippery slope of making quality of life assessments 
without any principled means of making such decisions: see, for example, J Keown, “Beyond 
Bland: a critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing medical treatment” (2000) 
20 Legal Studies 66.  Some suggest that the test is flawed for other reasons, for example, that the 
test “lends itself to interpretation” depending on the “correct framing of the question”: JK Mason, 
RA McCall Smith and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (6th ed, 2002) 518.  Others suggest that 
the notion of an adult having “best interests” in this kind of case is a fiction: Airedale NHS Trust v 
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interests test was considered in detail in the landmark English case of Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland.58 Anthony Bland was 17 years old when he was seriously injured in 
the Hillsborough football ground disaster in 1989.  His lungs were crushed and 
punctured, and the supply of oxygen to his brain was interrupted causing him to 
sustain irreversible brain damage. He was left in a persistent vegetative state and there 
was no hope of recovery.  The English House of Lords held that it was lawful for the 
health providers to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration because the patient’s 
“best interests” no longer required continued treatment.  That withdrawing the 
artificial nutrition and hydration was lawful was also the unanimous view of the 
judges in the courts below who heard the case before it reached the House of Lords.
The most important consideration in assessing what was in Anthony’s best interests in 
almost all of the judgments was responsible medical opinion, that is, whether from a 
medical perspective it is appropriate to continue treatment.59 An assessment of what 
responsible medical opinion required in this case was based on the seriousness of the 
patient’s condition and the limited likelihood of recovery, together with the lack of 
therapeutic, medical or other benefit from the treatment that he was being given. 
In addition to responsible medical opinion (or even as part of it),60 a number of other 
factors were considered to be relevant in assessing what was in Anthony’s best 
interests, namely: 
x what he would have wanted;61
x the views of his family;62
x the lack of dignity for him to continue to be subjected to such invasive 
measures;63
x his desire to be remembered as carefree;64 and 
x the ordeal that the treatment involved for his family.65
                           
Bland [1993] AC 789, 897 (Lord Mustill), 858 (Lord Keith).  Also of concern is the increased 
difficulty in applying the test when the adult is not in a persistent vegetative state.  Concern has 
been expressed about the possibility of the test being applied in cases of dementia where an adult 
has suffered a serious stroke: JK Mason, RA McCall Smith and GT Laurie, Law and Medical 
Ethics (6th ed, 2002) 515. 
58 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. This “best interests” test has been adopted widely 
throughout the common law world, including for example, New Zealand (Auckland Area Health 
Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235; Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201) and Ireland (In the 
Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401). 
59  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 883-884 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 871 
(Lord Goff). 
60 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 871 (Lord Goff). See also Auckland Area Health 
Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 250-251. 
61  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 817 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 833 (Hoffman 
LJ), 872 (Lord Goff). 
62  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 817 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 828 (Hoffman 
LJ), 871 (Lord Goff). 
63  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 813 (Bingham MR), 822 (Butler-Sloss 
LJ), 869 (Lord Goff), 883-884 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
64  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 813 (Bingham MR), 822 (Butler-Sloss 
LJ).
65  For example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 813 (Bingham MR), 830 (Hoffman LJ), 
cf 897 (Lord Mustill). 
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More recently, there has been a shift since Bland for an adult’s “best interests” to be 
informed more by these non medical considerations than had been the case in the 
past.66 Criticisms are still made, however, that undue weight is given to the medical 
aspects of a person’s best interests.67
                                                                                                                            
66  See, for example, the often quoted statement by Butler-Sloss P in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 
1 FLR 549, 555: “best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare issues.” 
67  For example, some commentators have criticised the best interests test as being “medicalised” (JK 
Mason, RA McCall Smith and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (6th ed, 2002) 513-514) while 
others are critical of the paternalism (which they describe as “doctor knows best”) as being 
“endemic in English medical law” (I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 2000) 2105). 
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Part 3 – Issues for Consideration 
This Part identifies 14 issues for consideration in the law that governs withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures under the PAA and GAA. These issues are 
grouped loosely around three themes that are considered in their own sections: 
advance health directives, general decision making considerations and issues of 
criminal law. 
Each issue is considered in the same way. First, the potential problem is briefly 
identified and a case study or case studies are proposed to illustrate why the issue may 
cause difficulties. Then the law under the PAA and GAA is outlined, often 
supplemented by a comparison with the position under the common law. That 
discussion of the law is applied to the proposed case study to illustrate why the issue 
is seen as problematic. The consideration of each issue then concludes with a 
discussion of potential reform options and one or more questions designed to generate 
and focus comment. 
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Section 1 – Advance Health Directives 
Section 1 brings together a group of issues associated with advance health directives 
(“AHDs”), and sometimes enduring documents generally. The first issue raises a 
broad policy consideration relating to whether common law advance directives (which 
are directives that do not comply with the formality requirements of the Queensland 
legislation) should be binding on health providers.  The second issue also raises an 
important matter of policy, namely the circumstances in which an AHD that directs 
the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure should operate.  At 
common law, there are not any restrictions, yet a number are imposed by the statutory 
regime.   
The third, fourth and fifth issues consider protection of health providers regarding 
compliance with AHDs:  
x What is the position where they rely on an invalid AHD?  
x What if they provide treatment without knowing of the existence of an AHD? 
x What if they are aware of an AHD and its contents but consider that, in the 
circumstances of the case, its directions should not be followed. 
The sixth issue deals with a practical concern regarding AHDs, namely the ways in 
which health providers can be satisfied that the document that they sight is the 
patient’s AHD, or a true and correct copy of it.  Finally, a seventh issue examined is 
the protection that is given to health providers in an emergency context, particularly in 
terms of their obligations where they have become aware that an AHD might have 
been completed by the patient. 
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Issue 1 – Wider recognition of advance directives 
about health care 
1.1 The problem 
Under the common law, an individual can give a direction about their future health 
care and this must be followed by health providers. There are no specific requirements 
as to the form of such a direction so, for example, a card completed by a Jehovah’s 
Witness about refusing blood products would constitute a common law advance 
directive.  A discussion by an adult with his or her family about future treatment 
following a diagnosis of a serious illness such as dementia could also be a common 
law directive.   
The Queensland legislation specifically provides for advance health directives 
(“AHDs”) to be given before losing capacity. For them to be valid, the legislation 
requires that certain formalities be met such as witnessing by particular groups of 
people. This raises two issues: 
x Do common law advance directives continue to have legal force after the 
enactment of the Queensland legislation? 
x If they do not, should the law be changed so that common law advance 
directives have legal force? 
Case studies A and B illustrate the problem. 
Case study A 
Patricia is a strongly committed Jehovah’s Witness and thus holds firmly to the 
religious belief that she should not receive any blood or blood products, including 
blood transfusions. So that others are aware of her decision, including health 
providers who may treat her in the future, she carries a “No Blood” card. Her 
husband, Michael, shares her religious beliefs and is also opposed to this sort of 
treatment. 
Patricia is involved in a serious car accident and is unconscious when she is found. 
She is transferred to a local hospital where it becomes clear that she will require a 
blood transfusion to stay alive. Michael is torn between his religious beliefs and his 
concern that his wife will die. Faced with the reality of his wife’s death, he now 
argues with hospital staff that the transfusion should be given. The hospital staff are 
uncertain of their legal position given Patricia’s “No Blood” card and Michael’s 
insistence that she receive the transfusion. 
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Case study B 
Diane was 60 years old when she was diagnosed with dementia. She researched the 
illness and told her family that she did not want to receive any life-sustaining 
measures once she reached the stage that she lacked capacity to make health 
decisions for herself.  She specifically said that she did not want antibiotics if an 
infection threatened her life.  She only wanted to receive palliative care.  Some years 
later, when Diane lost capacity, she suffered a chest infection and her doctor wanted 
to commence antibiotics because she regarded this as good medical practice.  The 
antibiotics would cure the chest infection, but without them Diane could die.  Diane’s 
children advised the doctor that this was contrary to Diane’s express wishes and 
clear verbal directions to them, but because they felt that Diane still had many years 
left to live, they consented to the antibiotics.  The treating doctor is uncertain of her 
legal position. 
1.2 Operation of common law directives after the PAA and GAA
The common law 
The common law that existed before the statutory regime came into operation was 
simple. A “mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to 
medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even 
where that decision may lead to his or her own death.”68 The right to refuse life-
sustaining measures could operate even if the refusal was given in advance of the 
medical situation arising.69 In other words, before a patient lost capacity to make a 
decision about treatment, he or she could give a direction about their future medical 
treatment which would be binding on health providers. For such a directive to be 
legally binding, the adult must have had the capacity to make such a decision.70 In 
addition, a directive given in advance must also be clearly intended by the patient to 
cover the situation that subsequently arises.71
Although the Australian courts have not yet considered the validity of a common law 
advance directive, it is likely that the position as outlined would be accepted as part of 
Australia’s common law.72
                                           
68 Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 432 (Butler-Sloss LJ). See also Re B (adult: 
refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment)
[1992] 4 All ER 649; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de 
Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385. 
69 Re C (adult: refusal of medial treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 
AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff); Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653, 
662-663, 665-666 and 669; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
70  Where the decision regarding future treatment is particularly grave as in the case to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, the patient’s competence must be correspondingly high: Re B (adult: 
refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
71  Compare Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
72  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 357. Although 
not expressly addressing the point, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Qumsieh v Guardianship and 
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In case study A, Patricia has refused medical treatment needed to save her life through 
her “No Blood” card. Provided the card is sufficiently unambiguous in its terms, this 
refusal of treatment will be effective. At common law, this remains the case even 
though Patricia has now lost capacity due to the accident. If medical staff were to 
provide treatment contrary to those wishes, they would be guilty of an assault 
exposing them to both criminal73 and civil74 liability.  The same would apply in case 
study B.  If there was clear evidence of Diane’s direction not to be given antibiotics, 
that refusal will be binding on medical staff. 
Impact of the PAA and GAA 
It seems that the legislature intended that common law advance directives would 
operate alongside the scheme for AHDs that is set out in the PAA. Section 39 of the 
PAA provides as follows: 
39 Common law not affected 
This Act does not affect common law recognition of instructions about health care given by an 
adult that are not given in an advance health directive. 
However, despite the clear attempt to retain this aspect of the common law, it is 
suggested that s 66 of the GAA precludes its recognition. Section 66(1) of the GAA
states: “If an adult has impaired capacity for a health matter, the matter may only be 
dealt with under the first of the following subsections to apply” (emphasis added). 
The subsections that follow do not include directives that are recognised at common 
law.75
Outcome
It seems therefore that rather than an individual’s previously expressed wishes 
governing the situation, the decision making process established by the statutory 
scheme would apply. In other words, common law advance directives no longer have 
legal force under the statutory regime.  This means that Patricia’s statutory health 
attorney in case study A and Diane’s in case study B would make the decision, rather 
than the earlier direction given by the adult resolving the matter.  While this may lead 
to the same result in both cases, this would not be certain. Factors besides the views 
and wishes of the adult must be taken into consideration by the decision maker. 
                                                                                                                            
Administration Board & Anor [1998] VSCA 45 and the High Court in refusing special leave to 
appeal (Qumsieh v Pilgrim M98/1998 (29 October 1999, 11 February 2000)) seemed to accept that 
a common law advance directive would be binding in that jurisdiction.
73  Assault is an offence under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 246. 
74  Civil liability arises as a result of a trespass to the person and an action in assault or battery may be 
brought against the health provider: Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB 
(1992) 175 CLR 218, 232. In Queensland, the appropriate tort is assault because, as defined by 
s 245 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), it includes the tort of what was battery at common law: 
White v Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75. 
75  For a more detailed examination of why common law directives do not operate following the 
enactment of Queensland’s statutory regime, see B White and L Willmott, “Will You Do As I 
Ask? Recognition of Instructions about Health Care under Queensland’s Legislative Regime” 
(2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77. 
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1.3 Should common law directives continue to operate? 
Case studies A and B raise squarely the issue of whether common law advance 
directives should continue to operate notwithstanding the establishment of a regime 
under the PAA for executing a formal AHD.  In other words, if an adult has not 
completed an AHD that complies with the formality requirements of the legislation, 
but has clearly indicated in some other way his or her desired treatment (as occurred 
in case studies A and B), should those directions be followed?   
Whether a common law directive that does not comply with the formality 
requirements of the PAA (and therefore is not an AHD under the legislation) should 
continue to be binding was considered by the Queensland Law Reform Commission 
(the “QLRC”).76 The relevant issue to be resolved was whether common law 
instructions should be allowed to continue to operate given that the QLRC was 
proposing to include statutory AHDs as part of the decision making regime. These 
directives, under the proposed reforms, needed to comply with certain formal 
requirements that were not necessary for recognition of directives at common law. 
The Commission recognised that there are arguments both in support of and against 
recognising common law directives.  The arguments identified by the QLRC and 
others are considered below. 
Arguments in favour of recognising common law advance directives 
A compelling reason why common law advance directives should be recognised is 
that this is consistent with the notions of self-determination and autonomy that were 
discussed earlier.  The right to refuse medical treatment should not be lost simply 
because legislation exists that formalises the procedure for giving advance directives.  
The QLRC recommended preserving the common law as it would “maximise the 
opportunity for people to exercise control over their future medical treatment”.77
Secondly, it is likely that the community would expect that directives that an adult has 
made in advance of losing capacity would be binding at a future time.  In case studies 
A and B, for example, Patricia and Diane respectively are likely to think that their 
wishes would be binding on health providers.  Recognising common law advance 
directives would therefore reflect existing community beliefs and views. 
Thirdly, recognition of a less formal kind of advance directive (that is, a common law 
advance directive) could promote advance care planning within the community to a 
larger extent.  Such planning is likely to result in treatment being more in accordance 
with patients’ wishes, and there is some evidence to support this suggestion.  A pilot 
program was conducted in Melbourne’s Austin and Repatriation Medical Centre 
based on a United States program “Respecting Choices”.  Part of this program 
involved discussions with patients and families about end of life health care options.  
                                           
76  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1.  As was 
discussed in Part 1, the PAA and GAA are based largely on recommendations made by the QLRC 
after a comprehensive review of the law in Queensland.
77  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 358. 
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“Patient advance request” documents were completed on admission and placed at the 
front of the patient records.78  A detailed review of the United States program 
indicated that completion of advance requests and enduring medical powers of 
attorney increased from 4% to 96% of patients over two years.79   There was also 
evidence that in 98% of cases, end of life treatment was in accordance with the 
patient’s wishes. 
The extensive nature of the formal requirements for AHDs in Queensland may mean 
that fewer individuals complete these documents than would otherwise be the case.  It 
is arguable that if there was a more informal way to document patient wishes, more 
patients may give an advance directive.  This could occur, for example, on admission 
to hospital.  However, because these instructions would not comply with the formality 
required by the PAA, they would not constitute AHDs under the legislation.  Further, 
as the law currently stands, these sorts of instructions, although amounting to advance 
directives at common law, would not be recognised in Queensland.
Arguments against recognising common law advance directives 
The first argument against recognising common law advance directives is that it 
would create a two-tier system under which both statutory AHDs and common law 
advance directives operated.  This prompted the QLRC to comment that this “might 
lead to unnecessary uncertainty and could undermine any restrictions which the 
legislation attempted to impose.”80 One worry was that the legislation could be 
circumvented, for example, if the formality requirements regarding execution of an 
AHD were not met. In that case, the document could still be enforceable at common 
law despite not complying with the formality requirements that were imposed for 
sound policy reasons. 
Secondly, and following on from the first argument, recognition of common law 
advance directives would not only result in a two-tier system, but those tiers would 
also apply different law without any justification for that difference.  As will be 
discussed in Issue 2, AHDs in relation to withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
measures will only operate in limited circumstances.  For example, the adult must be 
very sick and fall within one of the conditions set out in s 36(2)(a) of the PAA.  These 
limitations were inserted in the legislation for policy reasons.  If common law advance 
directives were recognised, and they are not subject to these same limitations, it would 
undermine the policy choices made in the legislation. 
Thirdly, common law advance directives may lack the specificity needed to be of 
assistance to health providers.  To satisfy the formal requirements of the PAA, a 
doctor must certify as to the capacity of the adult to complete an AHD, the process of 
which would involve discussing the nature and content of the proposed document.  
This means that the adult will give careful consideration to the kind of treatment that 
                                           
78  “Respecting Patient Choices – Use of Advance Care Plans” Australian Resource Centre for 
Healthcare Innovations Net News, 31 October 2002, available at 
http://www.archi.net.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/118374/fromItemId/117149. 
79  BJ Hammes and BL Rooney, “Death and end-of-life planning in one mid-western community” 
(1998) Archives of Internal Medicine 158, 383-390.  
80  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 358. 
Issues  for Considerat ion  28
he or she wishes to receive or refuse.  It is likely that the document that is then 
completed will provide specific guidance to health providers who are later confronted 
with a decision regarding life-sustaining measures.  A common law advance directive 
that results, for example, from a discussion with family members (as in case study B) 
is unlikely to provide the same detailed guidance to the health provider. 
1.4 Reform issues 
On balance, the QLRC recommended that the recognition of common law instructions 
should be preserved.81 It was of the view that reform in this area should not detract 
from the common law rights that a person already had. The effect of the 
Commission’s recommendations was that a person’s common law instructions would 
be enforced without recourse to the statutory decision making regime if there were 
sufficient evidence that it represented the wishes of the person in the context of the 
particular health decision. Alternatively, a person had the right to execute an AHD 
under the proposed legislation. In the case of a conflict between the two, the 
Commission recommended that an AHD executed under the legislation would take 
priority.
The current position does not reflect what was intended to be the law by the QLRC. 
However, it would be possible to alter the PAA to give effect to common law advance 
directives should that be the approach desired. This could be done by amending s 39 
of the PAA. It currently reads: 
39 Common law not affected 
This Act does not affect common law recognition of instructions about health care given by an 
adult that are not given in an advance health directive.
It is suggested that the words “This Act does not affect” be replaced by “Neither this 
Act nor the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 affects” so that it would read: 
39 Common law not affected 
Neither this Act nor the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 affects common law 
recognition of instructions about health care given by an adult that are not given in an 
advance health directive. 
Such a provision would permit the recognition at common law of instructions given 
about health care despite those instructions not being in an AHD that complies with 
the formal requirements of the legislation. This would mean that Patricia’s “No 
Blood” card and Diane’s directions to her family in our case studies could be effective 
to refuse treatment. 
                                           
81  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by 
and for people with a decision-making disability, Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 357-358. 
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Q1: Should the PAA and GAA recognise a valid common law advance directive
as being binding on health providers?
Q2: If you answered “yes” to Q1, should there be any limitations (like those
discussed in Issue 2) on the extent to which a common law advance 
directive should operate?
Q1: Should the PAA and GAA recognise a valid common law advance directive
as being binding on health providers?
Q2: If you answered “yes” to Q1, should there be any limitations (like those
discussed in Issue 2) on the extent to which a common law advance 
directive can operate? 
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Issue 2 – Limits on the operation of advance health 
directives
2.1 The problem 
The PAA imposes some limits on when an AHD that directs the withholding or 
withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure can operate. For example, one limit is that an 
adult’s health must be sufficiently poor. The effect of these limits is that a person 
cannot use an AHD executed under the legislation to make all of their health 
decisions. The question posed here is whether these limitations are appropriate. 
Case studies C, D and E illustrate a number of issues that arise out of the limitations 
set out in the legislation. 
Case study C 
Jeremy is a 45 year old man who has just had a significant stroke. It has severely 
damaged his mental capacity and he is now unable to leave his bed. His condition will 
not improve but he will continue to live for at least another decade. Unfortunately, 
Jeremy is also unable to swallow and so requires the insertion of a PEG tube to be 
artificially fed and hydrated. Prior to the stroke, Jeremy executed an AHD which 
stated that he did not want to receive life-sustaining measures (including artificial 
nutrition and hydration) if he was not able to live independently. 
Case study D 
Francesca is a 22 year old woman who has multiple sclerosis. She has become 
increasingly tired of the extensive health regime needed to manage her illness (which 
includes 3 hours of physiotherapy a day). Although her doctors have advised that she 
probably has between three to five years before she dies, she decides to complete an 
AHD which states that she does not want life-sustaining measures if they become 
necessary.
Francesca takes a turn for the worse and develops pneumonia which is so severe that 
she develops a fever, loses capacity to make decisions and requires artificial 
ventilation. The doctors are confident that she will recover from this bout of 
pneumonia but, in the meantime, ventilation is maintained. Francesca’s mother 
produces the validly executed AHD to the doctor. 
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Case study E 
Katrina is terminally ill with bone cancer and is expected to die within a year.  She 
develops an infection in her thigh bone but decides that she does not want it to be 
treated.  Accordingly, she executes a valid AHD which states that she does not want 
life-sustaining measures, including antibiotics.  As the infection takes hold, she 
develops a fever and becomes unable to make decisions about her own health care.  
The infection can be treated cheaply and easily with antibiotics.  Dr Wilson is aware 
of the AHD but decides that because the infection is relatively easy to cure, the 
antibiotics should be given. 
2.2 The common law 
At common law, there are no limits placed on the circumstances when an advance 
direction about health care can operate. Once it is established that the person had 
capacity at the time of making the direction and that the direction applies to the 
decision to be made,82 it is binding.83 So there is, for example, no requirement that a 
patient be suffering from a terminal illness before their advance direction could 
operate. This is based on the right to self-determination in that an adult can make 
decisions about their bodily integrity.84
Accordingly, in the three case studies list above, the wishes of Jeremy, Francesca and 
Katrina not to receive life-sustaining measures will be followed. 
2.3 The PAA
As was discussed in Part 2 of the Issues Paper, the PAA provides that a direction to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures in an AHD cannot operate unless two 
or three conditions are met, depending on the circumstances.85
The first is that the adult’s health must be sufficiently poor and the legislation requires 
the adult’s condition to fall within one of four categories: 
x a terminal illness (or a condition that is incurable or irreversible) from which 
the adult is expected to die within a year; 
x a persistent vegetative state; 
x permanently unconscious; or 
                                           
82  Compare Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 where the adult’s 
direction not to receive blood products did not apply to the ultimate clinical decision that had to be 
made because the adult’s direction related to a situation in which alternative products would have 
been adequate treatment. 
83  For a more detailed consideration of when an advance directive will be binding at common law, 
see B White and L Willmott, “Will You Do As I Ask? Instructions About Health Care in 
Queensland” (2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77, 78-80. 
84 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661-662. 
85 PAA, s 36(2). 
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x An illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect that 
the adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining measures will not be 
needed.
The second condition is that the AHD can only apply if the adult has no reasonable 
prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make decisions about his or her health.  
This condition is clearly satisfied where, for example, the adult is in a persistent 
vegetative state or suffering from end stage dementia. 
However, the position is not so clear in a situation such as case study E.  As Katrina’s 
infection worsens, she loses the capacity to make a decision about a health matter.  
The problem is that it is unclear whether the requirement of s 36(2)(c) that the adult 
“has no reasonable prospect of regaining capacity” is satisfied in this kind of case.  If 
her condition is not treated, Katrina certainly does satisfy the requirement as she will 
not regain capacity.  However, if treatment is given, she will regain capacity.  Given 
these two potential interpretations, the meaning of the limitation in s 36(2)(c) should 
be clarified.
This issue also has significant implications where a person executes an AHD refusing 
CPR. If CPR provides a reasonable prospect of regaining capacity, then the legislative 
requirement contained in s 36(2)(c) may prevent the AHD from operating. This may 
be an issue, for example, if an adult has terminal cancer and executes an AHD 
directing that he or she does not wish to receive CPR. If his or her condition is such 
that CPR provides a reasonable prospect of regaining capacity, that requirement in the 
legislation may not be met and the direction in the AHD will not operate. 
The third condition that can limit the operation of an AHD as it relates to life-
sustaining measures applies only if the document is being relied upon to not provide 
artificial nutrition and hydration. In these circumstances, the directive will only 
operate if the commencement or continuation of this treatment would be inconsistent 
with good medical practice. 
2.4 Reform issues 
The limitations in the legislation are obviously a change to the common law and may 
raise some difficulties. 
In case study C, Jeremy’s wishes as stated in his AHD cannot operate unless inserting 
the PEG tube and providing artificial nutrition and hydration is inconsistent with good 
medical practice. This veto of good medical practice goes beyond what exists at 
common law. 
It is worth noting that this requirement regarding good medical practice applies only 
in relation to artificial nutrition and hydration. This raises two issues, the first of 
which is whether it is appropriate for good medical practice to have a veto over such a 
decision. This issue is addressed generally below in Issue 9. The second issue (and the 
primary one being considered here) is whether there is any justification for the special 
treatment given to artificial nutrition and hydration. By contrast, if Jeremy needed to 
be ventilated or given life saving antibiotics after his stroke, compliance with good 
medical practice would be irrelevant. 
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In case study D, Francesca’s AHD cannot operate because Francesca’s condition does
not meet one of the required conditions in the PAA. She is not expected to die within 
one year, she is not permanently unconscious nor in a persistent vegetative state and 
her illness is also not so serious at this stage that she won’t recover from it. 
Accordingly, her wishes as set out in the AHD need not be followed.
A further difficulty in this area, as illustrated in case study E, is the uncertainty that
arises in relation to operation of s 36(2)(c).  It is likely that it was the intention of the 
legislature that AHDs would only be effective in allowing life-sustaining measures to 
be withheld or withdrawn if the adult had no reasonable prospect of regaining 
capacity if given appropriate treatment.  This is consistent with the legislature’s
attempt in s 36(2) to limit the circumstances in which the AHD would operate in the 
context of life-sustaining measures.  If this is correct, Katrina’s AHD would not
operate.  A similar issue may arise in case study D. 
Two matters probably need to be addressed in relation to this condition.  The first is 
whether, as a matter of policy, Katrina’s and Francesca’s AHDs should operate.  The 
second is that, whichever policy option is chosen, the provision should be redrafted so 
that its meaning is clear.
A final point is to contrast the common law with the law as stated under the PAA and, 
for the purposes of this exercise, we will assume that the legislative regime recognises
the validity of common law directives, as Parliament originally intended.86 An AHD 
completed under the PAA is more likely to be a reliable and honest reflection of the 
wishes of a person than a common law directive because of the extensive procedural
safeguards, including the requirement to have a doctor discuss the adult’s views and 
then witness the document. The conditions in s 36(2) lead to the absurd situation that
the greater the formal safeguards attached to the directive, that is an AHD under the
PAA rather than at common law, the less scope for operation it has. By contrast, a 
common law directive, which can simply be a verbal statement prior to losing
capacity, can apply in a range of situations where a formal AHD could not. 
Q3: Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the
adult’s health is sufficiently poor such that it meets one of the conditions
described in s 36(2)(a) as set out above?
Q4: Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the
adult does not have a reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed
to make decisions about his or her health? 
Q3: Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the
adult’s health is sufficiently poor such that it meets one of the conditions
described in s 36(2)(a) as set out above?
Q4: Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the
adult does not have a reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed
to make decisions about his or her health? 
86 It was suggested in Issue 1 that common law directives are not able to operate in Queensland after
the GAA was passed. 
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Q5: Should the condition discussed in Q4 (that the adult has no reasonable
prospect of regaining capacity for health matters) be regarded as being met
if the treatment that the AHD purports to refuse could enable the adult to 
recover that capacity?
Q6: Should the PAA continue to draw a distinction in AHDs between artificial
nutrition and hydration and other kinds of life-sustaining measures by
imposing a requirement of good medical practice on the former but not the
latter?
Q5: Should the condition discussed in Q4 (that the adult has no reasonable
prospect of regaining capacity for health matters) be regarded as being met
if the treatment that the AHD purports to refuse could enable the adult to 
recover that capacity?
Q6: Should the PAA continue to draw a distinction in AHDs between artificial
nutrition and hydration and other kinds of life-sustaining measures by
imposing a requirement of good medical practice on the former but not the
latter?
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Issue 3 – Protection for health providers relying on 
invalid advance health directives 
3.1 The problem 
The PAA sets out rigorous formality requirements for executing an AHD. An AHD 
must be in writing, signed by the adult, and be signed and dated by a witness87 who 
must certify that the adult appeared to have capacity to make the document.88  It must 
also include a certificate signed and dated by a doctor stating that the adult had the 
capacity to make the AHD.89  These complex requirements may inadvertently not be 
satisfied and this raises the issue of whether there is sufficient protection afforded to a 
health provider if he or she relies, in good faith, on a document that does not comply 
with the formalities of the legislation.90
Case studies F, G and H illustrate this concern. 
Case study F 
Rhonda was 65 years old when she was diagnosed with dementia. Soon after her 
diagnosis, she completed an AHD under which she directed that, should she lose her 
capacity to make decisions for herself, she did not want to receive any life-sustaining 
measures that might be needed to keep her alive. The AHD is duly executed in all 
respects except that the witness did not date the document. 
Rhonda’s condition deteriorated quickly and she has now lost capacity to make health 
decisions for herself. She is being cared for by her daughter, Gloria, who is also her 
statutory health attorney under the legislation.91 Rhonda is in hospital for a minor 
procedure and unexpectedly suffers a cardiac arrest. Dr Jones had read Rhonda’s 
AHD and so relies on it to not provide Rhonda with cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(“CPR”). He did not notice that the witness did not date the document.  Rhonda dies. 
If the decision had been left to Gloria as statutory health attorney (which would have 
been the case in the absence of an AHD), she would have directed that her mother be 
given CPR.  Such a course would also have been consistent with good medical 
practice.
                                           
87 PAA, s 44(2)-(3).  There is also provision for an AHD to be signed on behalf of the adult: PAA, s 
44(3)(a)(ii). 
88 PAA, s 44(4). 
89 PAA, s 44(6). 
90  The formality requirements of the legislation also extend to enduring powers of attorney under 
which an attorney can be appointed to make a decision about a health matter.  Some of the 
concerns about the protection of health providers that are discussed in this issue may also apply 
where a health provider acts upon the instructions of an attorney appointed under a document that 
fails to comply with the formal requirements.  
91 PAA, s 63(1). 
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Case study G 
Assume the same factual situation as in case study F, except that the AHD did not 
contain a certificate by a doctor testifying to Rhonda’s capacity to complete the AHD.
Case study H 
Assume the same factual situation as in case study G, except that Dr Jones asked a 
nurse about directions that were contained in Rhonda’s AHD, but did not check the 
document himself. The nurse did not notice that the AHD was not certified by a 
doctor.  Dr Jones relies on the information from the nurse when Rhonda suffers a 
cardiac arrest and does not provide Rhonda with CPR.
3.2 Protection for health providers 
A health provider who relies on an invalid AHD in many cases will be protected by 
s 100 of the PAA.
100 Additional protection if unaware of invalidity in health context 
A person, other than an attorney, who, without knowing an advance health directive or a 
power for a health matter under an enduring document is invalid, acts in reliance on the 
directive or purported exercise of the power, does not incur any liability, either to the adult or 
anyone else, because of the invalidity. 
If a health provider does not fall within the protection of s 100, he or she may be at 
risk of prosecution. For example, in the circumstances of case study F, it may be that 
good medical practice required CPR to be administered to Rhonda. A failure to 
provide that treatment, that failure being contrary to good medical practice, may 
potentially expose Dr Jones to civil and criminal sanctions. He may have breached his 
duty to provide Rhonda with appropriate medical treatment.92
The following two requirements must be satisfied for a health provider to receive 
protection under s 100 of the PAA:
x the AHD was invalid; and 
x the health provider did not know that the AHD was invalid. 
Meaning of Invalidity  
Section 100 contemplates either of the following being invalid: 
x an AHD; or 
                                           
92  Further, if the AHD is invalid, Dr Jones may have committed an offence because he has withheld a 
life-sustaining measure (which may fall within the definition of “health care”) without obtaining 
the appropriate consent under the legislation: GAA, s 79. 
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x a power for a health matter under an enduring document. 
A “power for a health matter under an enduring document” refers to the situation 
where, for example, an adult confers upon another (through either an enduring power 
of attorney or an AHD) a power to make decisions regarding health matters. 
Section 96 of the PAA defines “invalidity”, but only as it relates to “a power under a 
document”. 
96 Interpretation 
In this part –  
“invalidity”, of a power under a document, means invalidity because – 
(a) the document was made in another State and does not comply with the other State’s 
requirements; or 
(b) the power is not exercisable at the time it is purportedly exercised; or 
(c) the document has been revoked. 
The definition seems to be exhaustive in its terminology in that a power will only be 
invalid if any of paragraphs (a) – (c) apply.  Section 96 is silent regarding the situation 
where the document conferring the power is not properly executed as required by the 
legislation.  Ordinarily a document that does not comply with formal requirements is 
regarded as “invalid”.  It is therefore surprising that such a situation is not included 
within the definition of invalidity in s 96. 
The meaning of “invalidity” in the context of AHDs also raises difficulties.  The PAA
does not specify what is meant by “invalid” in the context of an AHD as the s 96 
definition only applies to invalidity of “a power under a document”.93 It is likely that 
the meaning of “invalid” would include an AHD that does not comply with the formal 
requirements of the PAA, but this is not stated in the legislation. If this approach is 
correct, the AHDs referred to in case studies F, G and H would be invalid within the 
meaning of s 100 and its protection may apply. 
Also unclear is whether the term “invalidity” includes an AHD that has been revoked 
or indeed never existed. Assume, for example, that the AHD in case study F had been 
duly executed but subsequently revoked. Dr Jones relied on the AHD and did not 
provide life-sustaining measures, not knowing that Rhonda’s wishes had changed and 
the document had been revoked. It is probably the intention of the legislature that a 
doctor would be protected by s 100 in such a case. However, on a strictly legal 
analysis, the AHD is perhaps more correctly described as “no longer operative” rather 
than “invalid”. 
Knowledge of invalidity 
A health provider who relies on an invalid AHD is protected under s 100 only if he or 
she does not “know” that the AHD (or the power for a health matter under an 
enduring document) is invalid. Again, s 96 of the PAA defines “know” but only in the 
                                           
93  Note, however, that s 96 may apply to an AHD if it grants power to an attorney to make a decision 
about a health matter. The authors are of the view that s 96 would not otherwise apply to an AHD. 
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context of knowing of the invalidity of a “power under an enduring document” rather 
than knowing of the invalidity of an AHD.
96 Interpretation 
In this part – 
 “know”, of a power’s invalidity, includes – 
(a) know of the happening of an event that invalidates the power; or 
(b) have reason to believe the power is invalid. 
The legislation does not clarify when a health provider will be regarded as having 
“knowledge” of invalidity of an AHD. This can create problems as there are a number 
of levels on which a person can be regarded as having “knowledge”. 
x Actual knowledge 
The law as to what will be included as knowledge is somewhat unclear.94 However, in 
general, a person will be held to know something only if he or she has actual belief in 
its truth,95 so that knowledge is never imputed.96  The term clearly incorporates actual 
knowledge, so if the health provider has actual knowledge that an AHD is invalid, he 
or she will not be able to rely on s 100.  It would, of course, be unusual for a health 
provider to base their decision not to treat on an AHD that they know is invalid. 
Case study F is likely to represent a more common scenario where an AHD is relied 
upon in the belief that it is valid, but it is in fact invalid through a failure to comply 
with the formalities of the legislation. In case study F, the witness did not date the 
document, and Dr Jones was not aware of this omission. Section 100 is likely to 
afford protection in this case.  The legislation does not impose on a health provider a 
precondition for protection under s 100 that he or she takes reasonable steps to check 
the AHD to ensure that it is validly executed. 
x “Imputed” knowledge 
Although the health providers in case studies G and H do not have actual knowledge 
of invalidity of the AHD, these examples are more problematic.  In case study G, Dr 
Jones himself read the document but did not realise that a doctor had not certified as 
to the adult’s capacity to complete the AHD.  In case study H, Dr Jones relied on the 
nurse who failed to notice this deficiency.  The AHD is clearly invalid because the 
formality requirements have not been met, but in neither case does Dr Jones have 
actual knowledge of the invalidity. However, this is knowledge that he would have if 
he had read the AHD more closely in case study G, or read it at all in case study H.  
This raises the question of whether Dr Jones should be regarded (or imputed) as 
having the knowledge that a person would have possessed if he or she had made the 
inquiries that a reasonable person would have made in the circumstances. 
                                           
94  See generally “Knowledge”, Butterworths Online, [6-515], available at 
http://www.butterworthsonline.com.  In particular, the uncertainty arises because cases in this area 
involve interpretation of other statutes, which have different purposes and often use different 
language and concepts (for example, the word “knowing”, or the concept of intention). 
95 R v Raad [1983] 3 NSWLR 344, 346. 
96 Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473, 504-507. 
39 Rethinking Li fe-Sustaining Measures
As the legislation currently stands, it is not a precondition for protection under s 100 
that a health provider takes reasonable steps to check the AHD to ensure that it is 
validly executed.  The health provider therefore would probably not be regarded as 
having knowledge in case studies G and H. 
x “Wilful blindness” 
Another possible scenario which is not adequately addressed by the legislation is 
where a health provider suspects an AHD has not been properly completed but 
deliberately refuses to check in case he or she discovers that the document has not 
been properly executed.97  In a case such as this, it may be that “knowledge” is 
interpreted more broadly than just actual knowledge. It has been said that “…if the 
suspicions of [a person] are aroused, and he [or she] deliberately refrains from making 
any inquiries for fear that he [or she] may learn the truth, his [or her] ‘wilful 
blindness’ may be treated as equivalent to knowledge.”98  Wilful blindness is a refusal 
to acknowledge the existence of facts that are apparent from the circumstances, such 
as failing to make inquiries in a situation that makes clear that further investigation is 
needed.99  In our situation, if the health provider had information that alerted him or 
her to the fact that the AHD may be invalid but deliberately avoided checking the 
document so that he or she would not actually know of the invalidity, then perhaps 
this may be regarded as “knowledge” of the invalidity. 
3.3 Reform issues 
The preceding discussion raises two issues that are in need of clarification. 
Meaning of invalidity 
First, what is the meaning of “invalid” in s 100 in the context of an AHD? It is likely 
that it refers to a failure to comply with the formality requirements imposed by the 
PAA, but there are some doubts as to whether the term includes situations where an 
AHD has been revoked, or where the document has never existed. It may be desirable 
to define the term “invalidity” as it applies in the context of an AHD as well as in the 
context of a “power … under an enduring document” to clarify this issue.  (It may 
also be helpful if the definition of “invalidity” in the context of a power under a 
document be expanded to include the situation when the document does not comply 
with the formality requirements of the legislation.) 
Circumstances in which protection should be afforded 
Secondly, there are difficulties regarding what is meant by “knowing” within s 100 in 
the context of an AHD. As the provision is currently drafted, it is unclear whether 
protection is only lost if the health provider has actual knowledge of the invalidity, or 
whether something less than that (for example, the potential imputed knowledge in 
case studies G and H) will mean that the health provider will lose the benefit of this 
protection.
                                           
97  Compare para (b) of the definition of “know” in s 96 of the PAA.
98 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523, 536 (Gibbs CJ, with whom Mason J agreed). 
99 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523. 
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This raises a broader policy consideration.  Protection is not, and should not, be
afforded to a health provider who has actual knowledge of the invalidity of an AHD 
yet relies upon it.  However, as we have seen, not all cases are so clear cut.
x Requirement to act in good faith?
Should a health provider be protected if he or she suspects that an AHD is not validly 
executed but deliberately chooses not to investigate its execution so that he or she will 
not have actual knowledge of its invalidity? In this case, the doctor has not acted in 
good faith and arguably should not be protected.
x Requirement for reasonable care and skill? 
Should a health provider be protected if he or she does not use reasonable care and 
skill to determine whether the AHD is validly executed? If protection were given 
only if this could be satisfied, it would mean that the health provider would need to 
take steps to ensure that the AHD has been validly executed.  Whether the steps taken 
are reasonable or not will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.  For
example, a less demanding standard would be asked of a health provider if there was
some element of urgency, as there may be less time to examine the AHD. 
It may be a preferable approach for protection to depend on whether the health 
provider has acted in good faith and with reasonable care and skill, rather on the 
notion of “knowledge”.  This would mean that each case would be judged on its own 
circumstances.  In some cases, for example, where the invalidity is less obvious (such 
as in case study F) and there was some urgency attached to treatment, it may be
appropriate that the doctor is excused for not discovering the invalidity.  On the other 
hand, if the AHD is clearly invalid (as in case study G and H) and there was no
urgency associated with treatment, then it may not be appropriate for the health 
provider to receive protection under s 100.  The invalidity of the AHD would have
been apparent had the health provider acted with reasonable care and skill.
Under this alternative approach, the determining factors would be good faith and 
reasonable care and skill, rather than “knowledge” with the associated difficulties 
regarding the meaning of this term.
Q7: Should the word “invalidity” as used in the context of an AHD in s 100 of 
the PAA be defined to clarify the circumstances in which the protection will
apply?
Q8: Should protection in s 100 of the PAA depend on whether the health
provider has “knowledge” of the invalidity (as is currently the case), or on
whether the health provider was acting in “good faith with reasonable care
and skill” in ascertaining the validity of the AHD?
Q7: Should the word “invalidity” as used in the context of an AHD in s 100 of 
the PAA be defined to clarify the circumstances in which the protection will
apply?
Q8: Should protection in s 100 of the PAA depend on whether the health
provider has “knowledge” of the invalidity (as is currently the case), or on
whether the health provider was acting in “good faith with reasonable care
and skill” in ascertaining the validity of the AHD?
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Q9: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s
“knowledge” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q10: If you answered “yes” to Q9, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)? 
Q9: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s
“knowledge” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q10: If you answered “yes” to Q9, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)? 
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Issue 4 – Protection for health providers where no 
knowledge of advance health directives 
4.1 The problem 
The previous issue considered the protection that is given to a health provider who 
acts upon a direction in an invalid AHD.  This issue also deals with protection that is 
given to a health provider, but in circumstances where directions in an AHD are not 
followed because the health provider did not know that the document existed.   
Case studies I and J illustrate the issue. 
Case study I 
Scott is a 60 year old University academic who lives on his own. He executed a valid 
AHD after he was diagnosed with terminal cancer.  He is expected to die within one 
year.  His AHD indicates that he did not want to receive life-sustaining treatment 
under any circumstances.  Scott suffered a heart attack and was taken to hospital.  
His condition stabilised but he was still very ill and it looked unlikely that he would 
recover to the extent that he would have much decision making ability left intact.  
Scott’s sister was his statutory health attorney and was contacted on his admission.  
Scott’s condition deteriorated further and it looked as if life-sustaining measures 
would be required to keep him alive so his sister consented to the giving of this 
treatment.  Neither the treating doctor, Dr Walsh, nor Scott’s sister were aware of the 
existence of the AHD.   
Case study J 
Assume the same facts as in case study I, except that Scott’s sister told Dr Walsh that 
she knew Scott had executed a document regarding future treatment.  Dr Walsh did 
not believe in AHDs so had not taken any notice of the statement, nor asked Scott’s 
regular doctor for details about the document. 
4.2 Protection for health providers  
Section 102 is the relevant provision of the PAA that may provide protection to a 
health provider who acts contrary to a direction in an AHD of which he or she is 
unaware.
102 Protection of health provider unaware of advance health directive 
A health provider is not affected by an adult’s advance health directive to the extent the health 
provider does not know the adult has an advance directive. 
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Knowledge of AHD 
As in the previous issue, the protection of a health provider turns on his or her 
“knowledge” of the AHD.  The meaning of this term for the purpose of s 102 is not 
clear because it is not defined and the same problems arise as outlined in Issue 3.   
x Actual knowledge 
The protection clearly extends to the situation, as in case study I, where the health 
provider does not follow the direction in an AHD because he or she did not have 
knowledge that one existed.  The treating doctor, Dr Walsh, would therefore be 
protected.
x “Imputed” knowledge 
Case study J is more difficult.  Although Dr Walsh does not have actual knowledge 
that a valid AHD exists, if he had made the inquiries that a reasonable person would 
have made in the circumstances, he may have discovered its existence and 
whereabouts.  As in Issue 3, however, it is currently not a precondition for protection 
under s 102 that a health provider take reasonable steps to establish whether or not an 
AHD exists. 
x “Wilful blindness” 
Case study J may alternatively raise the issue of wilful blindness.  This concept was 
explained in Issue 3.  Dr Walsh did not have actual knowledge of the AHD; he was, 
however, put on notice that a document regarding future treatment existed.  It is likely 
that he surmised that this was an AHD and, for his own reasons, he did not take any 
action to establish its existence or contents.  If the term “knowledge” refers to actual 
knowledge of its existence, then Dr Walsh would be protected because he does not 
know it is an AHD.  On the other hand, if “wilful blindness” can be regarded as the 
equivalent of “knowledge” (and, if the evidence suggests that Dr Walsh has been 
“wilfully blind” in this case), then he will not be protected by s 102.  The uncertainty 
in the provision is unsatisfactory and should be clarified. 
4.3 Reform issues 
In addition to the lack of clarity regarding the meaning of the word “know”, a broader 
policy consideration arises from s 102 and that is whether protection should only be 
given if health providers act in good faith and with reasonable care and skill in 
establishing whether an AHD exists.  This was considered under Issue 3 and that 
discussion is also relevant here.  If Dr Walsh had acted in good faith and with 
reasonable care and skill in case study J, he would have made inquiries of Scott’s 
treating doctor about the existence of an AHD and ascertained its contents.  If this 
occurred, the AHD is likely to have governed his treatment rather than a decision 
being made by Scott’s sister as statutory health attorney. 
A possible reform option would be to make the protection conferred by s 102 
conditional upon a health provider acting in good faith and with reasonable care and 
skill to establish whether an AHD existed.  A requirement to act in good faith would 
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mean that a health provider could not turn a blind eye when put on notice as to the
possibility that an AHD has been executed.  Secondly, a requirement to act with 
reasonable care and skill means that different steps would be required to satisfy this 
requirement depending on the circumstances of the case.  It may be that in the
ordinary course of treatment, reasonable care and skill would require a health provider
to enquire of a patient (or his or her family) as to whether an AHD had been executed.
However, if there is a degree of urgency with the treatment, it may be reasonable for
the health provider to take fewer steps to ascertain the existence of such a document
due to the need to treat quickly.
Q11: Should protection in s 102 of the PAA depend on whether the health
provider has “knowledge” that the adult has an AHD (as is currently the
case), or on whether the health provider was acting in “good faith with
reasonable care and skill” in ascertaining whether an AHD exists? 
Q12: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s
“knowledge” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q13: If you answered “yes” to Q12, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)?
Q11: Should protection in s 102 of the PAA depend on whether the health
provider has “knowledge” that the adult has an AHD (as is currently the
case), or on whether the health provider was acting in “good faith with
reasonable care and skill” in ascertaining whether an AHD exists? 
Q12: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s
“knowledge” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q13: If you answered “yes” to Q12, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)?
45 Rethinking Li fe-Sustaining Measures
Issue 5 – Deliberate non-compliance with advance 
health directives: a statutory excuse? 
5.1 The problem 
The previous issues considered the protection that is given to a health provider in two 
cases. The first case was where a health provider acts upon a direction in an invalid 
AHD, and the second was where he or she does not act upon a direction because he or 
she did not know about the AHD.  This issue deals with a different but associated 
issue: the protection that is given to a health provider who does not rely on a valid 
AHD even though he or she knows of its existence. 
A person who executes an AHD directing that he or she not be given life-sustaining 
measures in specified circumstances does so in the expectation that those directions 
will be respected. Yet, the PAA provides very broad protection for a health provider 
who chooses not to comply with a direction in an AHD that is otherwise legally 
binding. The health provider may prefer to treat the adult on the basis of what he or 
she regards to be principles of good medical practice, despite the adult’s wishes. 
Case studies K and L raise two different examples of this issue. 
Case study K 
Tran is a 30 year old woman with terminal cancer who is expected to die within a 
year. She has completed an AHD directing that she not receive life-sustaining 
measures even if they are needed to keep her alive. She has advised her treating 
doctor, Dr Jones, of the directions in her AHD. Dr Jones does not approve of AHDs, 
particularly in the circumstances of a patient like Tran who is still young and should 
be able to derive some enjoyment from her last year of life. 
Tran collapses and is rushed to hospital. Dr Jones is contacted and directs the staff to 
commence artificial respiration despite Tran’s directions not to do so in her AHD. 
Although Dr Jones has serious doubts about whether Tran will recover from this 
unexpected set back, he thinks it inappropriate, as a matter of good medical practice, 
to follow the directions in the AHD at this stage. He prefers instead to provide 
artificial respiration and assess her condition once she stabilises. 
Case study L 
Assume the same facts as in case study K, except that after completing the AHD, 
Tran’s personal circumstances have altered and she has indicated to Dr Jones that 
she is pleased that she still has a year left to live so that she can put her affairs in 
order and make peace with members of her family.   
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5.2 Protection for health providers 
Section 103 is the provision of the PAA that may provide protection to a health 
provider who has not followed directions in an AHD. 
103 Protection of health provider for non-compliance with advance health directive 
(1) This section applies if a health provider has reasonable grounds to believe that a 
direction in an advance health directive is uncertain or inconsistent with good medical 
practice or that circumstances, including advances in medical science, have changed to 
the extent that the terms of the direction are inappropriate. 
(2) The health provider does not incur any liability, either to the adult or anyone else, if the 
health provider does not act in accordance with the direction. 
(3) However, if an attorney is appointed under the advance health directive, the health 
provider has reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in the advance health 
directive is uncertain only if, among other things, the health provider has consulted the 
attorney about the direction. 
Section 103 of the PAA permits a health provider to avoid liability for not following 
an AHD in three circumstances. The first is if the health provider has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the direction is uncertain. This mirrors the common law as it 
requires a person to state their wishes clearly if they are refusing life-sustaining 
measures.100
The second circumstance is where the health provider has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a direction is inconsistent with good medical practice. This is the most 
controversial of the three circumstances in s 103 and such a defence has not been 
recognised at common law. Case study K provides an example of this situation. Dr 
Jones has decided not to follow Tran’s AHD because he regards her decision as being 
inconsistent with good medical practice.
One of the difficulties that this part of the defence raises is that an AHD may only be 
effective to the extent that it is not inconsistent with a health provider’s view (based 
on reasonable grounds) of what is good medical practice. This may erode one of the 
important functions of these documents: to make choices that others (including an 
adult’s health provider) may not agree with.  
Such a defence is also inconsistent with the philosophy behind s 36 which purports to 
allow AHDs to operate in situations where the direction is not consistent with good 
medical practice. Stating that artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withheld or 
withdrawn unless its commencement or continuation is inconsistent with good 
medical practice implies that good medical practice will not limit the operation of an 
AHD directed to other life-sustaining measures. 
The third circumstance where a health provider need not follow an AHD is if the 
health provider has reasonable grounds to believe that “circumstances, including 
advances in medical science, have changed to the extent that the terms of the direction 
are inappropriate.” This aspect of the section may also have a common law equivalent 
                                           
100 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661.
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in that there is case law which suggests that wishes in an advance directive “will not 
survive a material change in circumstances”.101  Case study L may be an example of 
where it is reasonable to disregard an AHD. Tran’s wishes are no longer adequately 
reflected by her AHD and health providers should be able to treat her accordingly
without fear of committing an offence. 
5.3 Reform issues 
The two different case studies above illustrate the difficulties in this area. Although
AHDs are important documents and should not be capable of being disregarded, there 
may be circumstances where it is appropriate not to follow their directions. However, 
if it is accepted that people should have the right to disagree with what might be 
medically indicated, it is important to limit those situations where AHDs are not 
followed to appropriate cases. 
Q14: Should health providers be able to not follow AHDs if they believe that the
directions in these documents are:
(a) uncertain?
(b) inconsistent with good medical practice?
(c) inappropriate because circumstances have changed since the document
was executed?
Q14: Should health providers be able to not follow AHDs if they believe that the
directions in these documents are:
(a) uncertain?
(b) inconsistent with good medical practice?
(c) inappropriate because circumstances have changed since the document
was executed?
101 Re HE [2003] 2 FLR 408, [29].
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Issue 6 – Proving copies of advance health directives
6.1 The problem 
The PAA sets out rigorous requirements for the execution and witnessing of an AHD 
before it will be valid.  The legislation also sets out a rigorous set of requirements for 
proving that a copy of an AHD (and enduring documents in general) is a true and 
complete copy of the original document. This raises the question of when and whether 
a health provider can rely on a copy of an AHD.
Case studies M and N illustrate the issue. 
Case study M 
Greg is suffering from terminal cancer and his prognosis is that he has only months 
left to live.  He has executed an AHD directing that he not receive life-sustaining 
measures if this sort of medical treatment is needed to keep him alive. The AHD is 
duly executed and is kept at home with his personal documents. He has photocopied 
the document and given the photocopy to his wife, Amanda, so that she will know 
what medical treatment he wants (or does not want) should he lose capacity to make 
his own decisions. 
Greg is having trouble breathing and Amanda takes him to hospital.  By the time they 
arrive, Greg has collapsed and the medical staff want to commence artificial 
respiration.  Amanda shows the treating doctor her copy of the AHD but the treating 
doctor, Dr Wilson, responds that he is unable to act on that copy as it is not duly 
certified as a true copy. 
Case study N 
Glenda is a 58 year old woman who lives in Brisbane. She is suffering from a 
terminal illness and has only a few months to live. Recently, Glenda had a heart 
attack and the ambulance was called by her neighbour. Glenda was revived and taken 
to hospital where her condition remained unstable. Mary is Glenda’s daughter and 
the only one of Glenda’s relatives living in Brisbane. The treating doctor, Dr Gordon, 
discussed Glenda’s condition with Mary and said that he thought it likely that she will 
have another heart attack. Glenda has also suffered significant brain injury and it is 
unlikely that she will recover her mental capacity. 
The next day, Mary returns with some papers she found amongst her mother’s 
belongings. One of these documents is a photocopy of an AHD which states that 
Glenda does not want CPR if it is needed. When Glenda suffers a second heart attack, 
Dr Gordon does not commence CPR in accordance with the AHD that Mary 
produced, and Glenda dies. 
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Three days later, Arnold, Glenda’s son, flies to Brisbane for her funeral and in the 
course of being executor of her will discovers evidence that Mary has faked the AHD 
by photocopying Glenda’s signatures in the relevant places. 
6.2 Authenticity of AHD 
The issue here is how a copy of an enduring document, in our cases, an AHD102 may 
be proved so that a health provider can rely on it as a true and complete copy. The 
relevant provision is s 45 of the PAA which provides for a procedure that involves 
certifying that each page of the copy, other than the last page, is a true and complete 
copy of the original.103 The last page of the copy must also then be certified to the 
effect that the copy is a true and complete copy of the original.104 Having outlined this 
process for proving a copy of an enduring document, s 45(6) then states: “This section 
does not prevent an enduring document being proved in another way.” 
One problem with s 45 is that, although the section sets out clearly one way in which 
a copy can be proved, there is no guidance as to how it may be “proved in another 
way”. Accordingly, a health provider confronted with a copy that is not proved by the 
certification method discussed above may potentially be able to rely on that copy 
(because an uncertified copy could be “another way” to prove the document), but this 
is uncertain because the legislation is so general.105
6.3 Outcomes
There are situations where this uncertainty won’t matter. One example, using case 
study M, is if Dr Wilson relied on the uncertified copy of Greg’s AHD and the 
original document is later produced. The GAA provides that if there is a valid and 
applicable AHD, then the matter must be dealt with according to that document,106
which is what has occurred here.
But there are situations where this uncertainty can cause problems. One is illustrated 
by case study M where Dr Wilson refuses to act on an uncertified copy of an AHD 
because he is unsure whether it is a true and complete copy. Although a photocopy 
may be considered sufficient proof of the original as discussed above, this is not 
certain and Dr Wilson would be entitled to refuse to follow the AHD. Section 102 
excuses not following an AHD if the health provider does not know of it107 and 
                                           
102 PAA, s 28. 
103 PAA, s 45(2). 
104 PAA, s 45(3). 
105  Indeed, an argument has been put forward that the effect of s 45(1) and (6) is that “another way” of 
proving the document cannot be by using such a copy because the section prescribes the only way 
that a copy can be proved and that is as certified as required by the section. This interpretation 
contemplates that the document may be proved in another way, for example, verbal authentication 
by a third party. 
106 GAA, s 66(2). 
107  See further Issue 4 regarding the meaning of “know” in the context of s 102. 
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presumably if the document is not proven a health provider could reasonably say that 
he or she did not have the required knowledge. 
Another set of problems can arise where a doctor does act on an uncertified copy of 
an AHD. One example, illustrated by case study N is where fraud has been committed 
and the copy produced is not one of a document completed by the adult. The copy 
purporting to be Glenda’s AHD has not been certified under s 45 so unless it is proved 
in “another way” (which seems very unlikely given that fraud has been involved), Dr 
Gordon could be liable for withholding CPR if this is not the appropriate treatment in 
the circumstances. He could perhaps try to seek the protection of Chapter 5 Part 5 of 
the PAA but for reasons discussed above, there is some doubt as to whether this Part 
would apply.108 It may be, however, that there are other defences that could apply 
such as the defence of an “honest and reasonable” mistake of fact109 in that Dr Gordon 
honestly and reasonably believed the copy to be genuine.
6.4 Reform issues 
The foregoing discussion raises an important issue, namely whether there is a more 
effective and convenient way to ensure the authenticity of an enduring document.  
One possibility that may be worth investigating is establishing a central registry in 
which AHDs can be registered.  Registration of an AHD would constitute evidence of 
validity and authenticity upon which a health provider could rely.  If health providers 
are able to search such a register, the problems illustrated in case studies M and N 
would be avoided. 
Registries of various kinds of enduring documents have been established in other 
jurisdictions.  In Singapore, for example, a register of "advance medical directives” 
has been established by statute,110 and a person who makes an advance medical 
directive must register it with the Registrar.111  A health provider is prohibited from 
acting on an unregistered directive.112  In the United States, private registries have 
been established for the electronic storage of advance directives. Such registries are 
funded through registration fees paid by health providers for the right to access and 
search the register and, in some cases, by those seeking to register their directives.  
For examples of private registries that have been established in the United States, see 
www.webdirectives.com or www.uslivingwillregistry.com.
In the absence of a strategy to deal with problems of authenticity, such as a registry, 
there are two aspects of s 45 of the PAA that may need to be addressed.  The first 
issue is whether the provision should be amended so as to clarify its operation. In 
particular, how an enduring document can be proved in “another way” should be 
                                           
108  See Issue 3 for a discussion of circumstances where those relying on an invalid enduring document 
will be protected under s 100 PAA. This protection may not cover case study N because arguably 
there is no AHD at all, only a fraudulently produced document purporting to be an AHD. See Issue 
5 for a discussion of protection given by s 103 PAA.  This too is not likely to apply because it 
excuses circumstances where AHDs are not followed, which is not the situation here. 
109 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 24. 
110 Advance Medical Directive Act 1996 (Singapore). 
111 Advance Medical Directive Act 1996 (Singapore), s 5(1). 
112 Advance Medical Directive Act 1996 (Singapore), s 5(3). 
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explained and it would perhaps be useful to include examples of how this might be
done in the legislation. 
The second issue is whether it is appropriate to require copies of enduring documents
to be certified in such a formal way. It is very unlikely that those who complete such a 
document are aware of these formality requirements. Rather, it is suggested that most
people would simply photocopy their AHD and give those uncertified copies to the 
relevant people. Although there may be some concerns about protecting against fraud, 
there may also be compelling arguments to try and give effect to an adult’s wishes as 
simply and effectively as possible. 
Q15: Would establishing a central register of AHDs be an appropriate way to
resolve concerns about the authenticity of these documents? Please provide
reasons for your view.
Q16: In the absence of a central register, should s 45 of the PAA be clarified to
explain how an enduring document may be proved in “another way”?
Q17: If you answered “yes” to Q16, should the certification and other
requirements imposed by s 45 of the PAA be relaxed so that a complete
photocopy is sufficient to prove an enduring document?
Q15: Would establishing a central register of AHDs be an appropriate way to
resolve concerns about the authenticity of these documents? Please provide
reasons for your view.
Q16: In the absence of a central register, should s 45 of the PAA be clarified to
explain how an enduring document may be proved in “another way”?
Q17: If you answered “yes” to Q16, should the certification and other
requirements imposed by s 45 of the PAA be relaxed so that a complete
photocopy is sufficient to prove an enduring document?
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Issue 7 – Emergency treatment and advance health 
directives
7.1 The problem 
A person who executes an AHD directing that he or she not be given life-sustaining 
measures in specified circumstances does so in the expectation that those directions 
will be respected.  However, health providers can be placed in a difficult position 
when called upon to give emergency treatment and are then told by a third party that 
the patient does not want life-sustaining measures to be initiated.  This situation can 
potentially raise the following issues: 
x What should be the course of action for a health provider in an emergency 
situation when advised of a patient’s AHD directing that treatment be 
withheld? 
x What protection is afforded to a health provider who, unsure of the validity or 
content of an AHD, nevertheless administers life-sustaining measures to the 
patient?  
Case study O illustrates the issue. 
Case study O 
Gary is an ambulance officer.  He received a call to a residential address having been 
advised that an elderly woman, Margaret, collapsed and was not breathing.  Gary 
arrived within minutes and was about to intubate Margaret but before he could do so, 
her daughter intervened, declaring that Margaret had executed an AHD. (The 
daughter was holding a document at the time.) She said that Margaret was dying of 
cancer and she didn’t want to be revived.  The daughter explained that she had simply 
panicked when Margaret stopped breathing and that she shouldn’t have called for 
assistance.  If Gary does not initiate life-sustaining measures immediately, Margaret 
will sustain severe brain damage.  There is no time to check the validity and details of 
the AHD. 
7.2 The common law 
At common law, a health provider owes his or her patient a duty under the law of 
negligence to act with reasonable care and skill.113  In the case of a life-threatening 
                                           
113 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. Although note that in this context of emergency, it is 
unlikely that a health provider will owe a legal duty to provide medical care to someone who is not 
an existing patient; compare Lowns v Woods (1996) Aust Torts Rep 81-376. 
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emergency, this duty would generally require the treating health provider to 
administer appropriate treatment.114 If the treatment is considered to be one of the 
“necessaries of life” (as it may be in such a situation), then a health provider who is in 
charge of the patient’s care would also be under a duty imposed by the criminal law to 
provide that treatment.115
As for all treatment, consent should be obtained before providing care,116 but in the 
case of an emergency this may not be possible if the person has lost capacity. In such 
circumstances, the common law doctrine of necessity allows medical assistance to be 
provided, where it is necessary to act, where medical assistance is a reasonable 
response and where the treating health provider does “no more than is reasonably 
required”.117 A limit on this, however, is that necessity cannot justify the giving of 
treatment where the patient has clearly refused it in advance of losing capacity.118
7.3 The PAA and GAA
The GAA interposes upon the doctrine of necessity. Section 63 permits urgent health 
care119 to be given without obtaining consent if the health care “should be carried out 
urgently to meet imminent risk to the adult's life or health”.120 As at common law, a 
limit on the ability to treat without consent in this situation is if the adult’s “health 
provider knows the adult objects to the health care in an advance health directive”.121
Knowledge
The major difficulty from a health provider’s perspective is raised by the phrase 
“knows the adult objects” because it is unclear when a health provider will be 
considered to know of an objection. The legal uncertainty surrounding the meaning of 
the term “know” was raised earlier in different contexts.122  Although similar issues 
arise here, because the treatment is being provided in an emergency context, there is 
less scope for a health provider to take steps to satisfy him or herself whether a valid 
AHD was in existence and whether it applied to the situation with which he or she 
may be confronted.   
                                           
114  There are, of course, exceptions. For example, at common law, a health provider is not obliged to 
provide futile treatment as it is not in a patient’s best interests: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 
AC 789; Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061.
115  The phrase “necessaries of life” comes from s 285 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) but the 
common law also recognises this duty: R v Stone [1977] QB 354. This duty to provide the 
necessaries of life under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) is discussed further in Issue 14. 
116  In re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 72; Secretary, Department of Health and 
Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218, 233. 
117 In re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 77. 
118 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR 
(4th) 321. 
119  Other than special health care: GAA, s 63(1).  “Special health care” is defined in PAA and GAA,
sch 2 s 7. 
120 GAA, s 63(1)(b)(i). The section also applies to health care that “should be carried out urgently to 
prevent significant pain or distress to the adult and it is not reasonably practicable to get consent” 
under the statutory regime: s 63(1)(b)(ii).  See also s 63A of the GAA which permits a life-
sustaining measure to be withheld or withdrawn in an acute emergency. 
121 GAA, s 63(2). 
122  See Issues 3 and 4 above. 
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If the health provider had actual knowledge that an AHD had been executed and 
covered the current situation, the treatment should not be provided.  However, as 
considered above, the issue is whether other degrees of knowledge, namely imputed 
knowledge or wilful blindness, will also be caught. For example, does a health 
provider “know” of an objection merely by suspecting it to be the case but he or she 
fails to make inquiries?  Does a health provider “know” of an objection if he or she, 
strongly believing treatment to be appropriate, deliberately avoids checking the AHD? 
Finally, does a health provider “know” of an objection if he or she is aware of the 
existence of the AHD but does not have time to check its contents or validity because 
of the urgency of the situation (as in case study O)? 
Turning to our case study, it is likely that Gary is protected. He has no actual 
knowledge of the contents or validity of the AHD and is not deliberately refraining 
from further enquiries.  He is simply unable to check the validity and contents of the 
AHD because the urgency of the situation requires him to act.   
Having said that, however, once treatment has commenced, the AHD should be 
checked for validity and content.  If the preconditions to the operation of the AHD are 
satisfied and it is a valid document, the directions in it should be followed and 
treatment withdrawn.  
7.4 Reform issues123
It is important that someone in Gary’s position who provides treatment as a matter of 
urgency be protected and it is likely that he would currently receive the protection of s 
63. This is because he does not have actual knowledge of the validity and content of 
the AHD as the urgency of the situation prevents him from satisfying himself of these 
issues.
However, the position is not clear and there may be two possible reform options.  The 
first is that suggested in Issues 3 and 4, namely to impose an obligation on a health 
provider when dealing with AHDs to act in good faith and with reasonable care and 
skill in ascertaining the validity and content of the AHD.  As s 63 deals with treatment 
in an emergency context, it may be reasonable in a particular fact situation for a health 
provider not to take any steps to check the validity or content of the AHD.  But what 
is reasonable will depend on the facts and, in another situation, it may be reasonable 
to require a health provider to investigate further. 
                                           
123  A minor suggestion not addressed in detail is that if the section is being revised, it might also be an 
appropriate time to modify an aspect of s 63 which does not create problems in law, but makes the 
section somewhat confusing. Section 63(5) provides that “health care” does not include 
“withholding or withdrawal” of a life-sustaining measure.  However, the section itself 
unquestionably does regulate the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures in s 63(2) 
and 63(3), as these subsections require, in certain circumstances, that such life-sustaining measures 
“not be carried out”. 
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An alternative approach would be to clarify the legislation by defining “knows” for
the purpose of s 63 of the GAA.124  It may also be appropriate to include an example
along the lines of case study O to make it clear that an individual in Gary’s situation 
will be protected from liability.125
Q18: Should protection in s 63(2) of the GAA depend on whether the health
provider “knows” that the adult objects to the health care in an AHD (as is
currently the case), or on whether the health provider was acting in “good
faith and with reasonable care and skill” in ascertaining whether the adult
objects to the health care in an AHD?
Q19: If you think that protection should depend on what the health provider
“knows” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q20: If you answered “yes” to Q19, should “know” include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)? 
Q18: Should protection in s 63(2) of the GAA depend on whether the health
provider “knows” that the adult objects to the health care in an AHD (as is
currently the case), or on whether the health provider was acting in “good
faith and with reasonable care and skill” in ascertaining whether the adult
objects to the health care in an AHD?
Q19: If you think that protection should depend on what the health provider
“knows” (as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be
clarified in the legislation?
Q20: If you answered “yes” to Q19, should “know” include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)? 
124 Although the term “know” is used elsewhere in the legislation, it may be preferable to define the
term specifically for the purpose of s 63.  “Wilful blindness” in an emergency context might be 
different from the same concept where there is more time to ascertain the existence, validity and
content of an AHD.
125 For example: “The urgency of a situation may reasonably prevent a health provider from inquiring
into the truth of his or her suspicion that the patient objects.”
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Section 2 – General Decision Making 
This section deals with six issues that are relevant when another is making the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures on behalf of an adult with 
impaired capacity. 
The first three issues in this section focus on the criteria that are considered in these 
decisions, and in particular, on the role of “good medical practice”. The first issue, 
Issue 8, considers the difficulties of assessing what are the requirements of good 
medical practice. The next issue queries whether the power (a veto based on good 
medical practice) given to health providers to prevent decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures from operating is appropriate. Issue 10 then raises 
the more general matter of the different principles that the legislation requires 
decision makers to have regard to when making these sorts of decisions. It highlights 
the need for further guidance in situations where different principles suggest different 
outcomes. 
The final three issues in this section raise some problems with definitions in the 
legislation. The first of these issues explores the possibility that the legislation might 
require a health provider to provide futile treatment unless consent to stop or not 
commence treatment is obtained. The next issue, Issue 12, then reveals that the 
definition of “health care” may inadvertently require all decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures to be driven by good medical practice. Issue 13 
asks whether the protection attached to treatment considered to be “life-sustaining 
measures” will apply to all care that is needed to keep a person alive. 
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Issue 8 – “Good medical practice”:
what does it mean? 
8.1 The problem 
The term “good medical practice” is used in the legislation in connection with 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures. However, there are 
currently no guidelines that are available in Queensland to guide decision makers and 
health providers alike in determining whether or not particular treatment is consistent 
with good medical practice. 
Case studies P and Q illustrate this issue. 
Case study P 
Violet is 75 years old and is very ill. She suffered a massive stroke 18 months ago 
which caused significant brain damage. As a result, she lost her swallowing reflex 
and a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (“PEG”) was inserted to provide her 
with artificial nutrition and hydration. Violet makes no meaningful response to visual, 
auditory, tactile or painful stimuli but the doctors are not in agreement regarding 
whether Violet could be regarded as being in a persistent vegetative state. Violet’s 
family wants the PEG withdrawn as they do not want her to endure any further 
indignity.
Dr Walsh understands their request, but is concerned about whether such action 
would be lawful as it is certain to result in Violet’s death. 
Case study Q 
James is 75 years old and is very ill. He suffered a massive stroke 18 months ago 
which caused significant brain damage. As a result, he lost his swallowing reflex and 
a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (“PEG”) was inserted to provide him with 
artificial nutrition and hydration. James makes no meaningful response to visual, 
auditory, tactile or painful stimuli but the doctors are not in agreement regarding 
whether James could be regarded as being in a persistent vegetative state. James has 
a son and a daughter. The son wants the PEG continued but the daughter wants it 
terminated. The matter is referred to the Adult Guardian. 
The Adult Guardian talks to James’ treating doctor, Dr Nelty about the matter. He 
advises that he has liaised with a number of his colleagues about James’ condition 
and medical opinion is divided about the appropriate treatment in this case. 
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8.2 Good medical practice under the PAA and GAA
The role played by good medical practice under the legislation differs depending on 
whether a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures is made by an 
adult through an AHD before losing capacity, or by someone on behalf of an adult. It 
is clear, however, from the following discussion that the notion of good medical 
practice plays a significant role in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
measures. 
Advance health directive 
If an adult has made an AHD before losing capacity, and the AHD deals with the 
situation that arises, that document will govern the matter. However, the legislation 
places a number of restrictions on the operation of an AHD in relation to a direction to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure. Firstly, the adult must be very sick 
before the direction can operate.126 Secondly, the adult must have no reasonable 
prospect of regaining capacity for health matters.127 Thirdly, if the direction relates to 
withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration (which would include 
the PEG in case studies P and Q), commencing or continuing the treatment must be 
inconsistent with good medical practice.128 The effect of this third restriction is that 
directions in an AHD to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration (but not other kinds of 
life-sustaining measures, such as artificial respiration or CPR) cannot operate without 
having regard to what constitutes good medical practice. 
Substituted decision maker 
If an adult has not completed an AHD, the legislation authorises another to make the 
decision on his or her behalf.129 In making a decision about withholding or 
withdrawing a life-sustaining measure (as in case studies P and Q), the decision maker 
must have regard to the general principles and health care principle that are set out in 
Schedule 1 to the PAA and the GAA.130 That is not where the matter ends, however, 
because any consent given to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure cannot 
operate “unless the adult’s health provider reasonably considers the commencement 
or continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice”.131
8.3 What constitutes good medical practice? 
Good medical practice is defined in Schedule 2.132
                                           
126 PAA, s 36(1)(a). As to whether these limits on the operation of AHDs are desirable, see further 
Issue 2 above.
127 PAA, s36(1)(c). 
128 PAA, s36(1)(b). 
129  The identity of that person will be determined by the adult’s personal circumstances: GAA s 66 and 
PAA s 63. See Part 2 for a discussion of the law in Queensland on end of life decision making. 
130  These principles and how they operate in this context are discussed further in Issue 10 below.
131 GAA, s 66A. 
132 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5B. 
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5B Good medical practice 
“Good medical practice” is good medical practice for the medical profession having regard 
to – 
(a) the recognised medical standards, practices and procedures of the medical 
profession in Australia; and 
(b) the recognised ethical standards of the medical profession in Australia.
Formal national guidelines that embody the recognised medical and ethical standards, 
practices and procedures regarding circumstances in which life-sustaining measures 
can properly be withheld or withdrawn do not exist.133 This is not the case in all 
jurisdictions. In England, for example, detailed guidelines exist regarding decision 
making in this context.134 There is some work, however, currently in progress in New 
South Wales to develop some guidelines to assist health providers and decision 
makers.135
Such guidance would have assisted Dr Walsh in case study P and the substitute 
decision maker (the Adult Guardian) in case study Q in deciding whether to withdraw 
or consent to the withdrawal respectively of treatment. 
8.4 Reform issues 
The above material raises at least the following issues for consideration. 
Test regarding good medical practice 
In the context of both a direction in an AHD (if it relates to artificial nutrition and 
hydration) and a decision made by a substituted decision maker, withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining measures can occur only if commencing or continuing 
treatment is inconsistent with good medical practice.
Medicine is not an exact science. There may be more than one legitimate and 
acceptable course of treatment in a particular situation. In case study Q, for example, 
Dr Nelty’s investigations found that there was a body of medical opinion which 
considered it sound treatment to continue PEG feeding while another body considered 
it sound to withdraw it. 
As the legislation is currently drafted, treatment can only be withheld or withdrawn if 
continuing or commencing treatment is inconsistent with good medical practice. This 
is a very high hurdle to satisfy. Arguably it means that if a responsible body of 
                                           
133  Although note that there is other guidance available to medical practitioners making these 
decisions. See, for example, guidelines produced by the Australian and New Zealand Society of 
Palliative Medicine (available at http://www.anzspm.org.au/guidelines/index.html) or the 
Australian Medical Association Position Statement on the Care of Severely and Terminally Ill 
Patients (available at http://www.ama.com.au/web.nsf/doc/SHED-5FK3DB).
134  British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment: 
Guidance for Decision Making (2nd ed, 2001).
135  New South Wales Health, Dying with Dignity: Revised Draft Guidelines for Clinical Decision 
Making at the End of Life (2000), available at http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/health- -
affairs/ ations/dwd/
public
public . See also New South Wales Health, Using Advance Care Directives
(2004), available at http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2004/adcare_directives.html.
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medical opinion believes treatment should commence or continue (even if this body 
does not represent the majority medical view), withholding or withdrawing treatment
will be unlawful.
Perhaps the legislation could strike a better balance and would be more reflective of 
medical opinion if the test permitted withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining
measures provided such action was consistent with good medical practice. 
Guidance regarding what constitutes good medical practice 
Over recent years, there have been repeated and consistent calls to develop guidelines 
to assist health providers and substitute decision makers in making decisions about 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures.136
As yet, there is no indication that progress is being made in Queensland to develop 
guidance in this regard. 
Q21: Should the test be reformulated so that it would be lawful to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining measures provided such a course is consistent with
good medical practice?
Q22: Should guidelines be developed to assist health providers and substitute
decision makers in making decisions about withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining measures?
Q21: Should the test be reformulated so that it would be lawful to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining measures provided such a course is consistent with
good medical practice?
Q22: Should guidelines be developed to assist health providers and substitute
decision makers in making decisions about withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining measures?
136 See for example, Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 at [71] and Adult Guardian, Annual Report (2000-
2003) 31-32.
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Issue 9 – “Good medical practice”: a right of veto? 
9.1 The problem 
The PAA and the GAA create a mechanism whereby another can consent for an adult 
with impaired decision making capacity. However, in the case of most decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, that consent cannot operate unless the 
adult’s health provider considers that commencing or continuing the treatment is 
inconsistent with good medical practice. The issue raised here is whether it is 
appropriate for a doctor to be able to prevent that consent from taking effect unless he 
or she regards the treatment as being inconsistent with good medical practice. 
Case study R 
Ruth, a 75 year old woman, had a stroke and was admitted to a hospital. She had 
difficulty swallowing so a nasogastric tube was inserted through which she could be 
provided with artificial nutrition and hydration. It is now two weeks later and Ruth’s 
condition has been assessed by her medical team. Their view is that her condition is 
such that she will almost certainly require a high level of care in a nursing home. 
Although she is not in a vegetative state, she appears to have very limited cortical 
activity. She is able to watch people with her eyes as they move around her room. 
However, it is impossible to elicit any other response. She does not vocalise and does 
not respond to moderately painful stimuli. There are times when she appears to be 
awake. She remains incapable of swallowing by herself and complications with the 
nasogastric tube mean that she will require artificial nutrition and hydration through 
a PEG to continue living. 
Ruth has always been a very independent person. Up until the stroke, she had lived in 
her own home, managed all of her affairs and was assertive in expressing her needs. 
In terms of her medical care, Ruth has always been very independent as well, and she 
has been clear in directing health providers and the rest of her family as to the care 
she wanted. She is also an active member of a community group called Older 
Consumers, which is an advocacy group for the economic rights of older people as 
consumers. At a number of meetings of this group, she has said in discussion with 
different people: “If I can’t live independently, without being hooked up to machines 
to survive, or things like that, I would rather they just let me go. Life is for living.” 
The medical evidence as to her future is divided. Some doctors think it unlikely that 
her mental condition will improve (but think that PEG feeding should be instituted for 
three months to monitor her condition). Others think that Ruth may regain some 
capacity, although she would not have the same level of mental functioning as in the 
past, and certainly would not be capable of making decisions about her future 
medical treatment. There is no disagreement, however, about the continued need for 
artificial nutrition and hydration. Even if Ruth recovers some mental capacity, she 
will always need to be fed in this way. 
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Ruth has a son (Jim) who she appointed as her attorney for health matters. Jim wants 
to stop the PEG feeding because that is what his mother wanted. Ruth also has a 
daughter (Margaret) who wants to see how her mother’s condition settles before 
deciding (although she agrees with Jim’s view of what her mother would have 
wanted). The doctor in charge of the medical team treating Ruth, Dr Efat, believes the 
PEG feeding should be started as he is of the opinion that good medical practice 
requires it. His view is that he may be happy to withhold this treatment at a later 
stage, but he wants to wait for Ruth’s condition to settle so he can ascertain how 
much mental capacity Ruth will have before making the decision. 
9.2 The common law 
The person who makes the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures 
at common law is the treating doctor.137 They are required to make that decision based 
on their assessment of what is in the “best interests of the patient”.138 Although the 
phrase “best interests” is necessarily vague, the early English cases in the area 
indicated that the primary factor considered under this test is responsible medical 
opinion, that is, whether from a medical perspective it is appropriate to continue 
treatment. Other factors taken into account to varying degrees under the best interests 
test include the views and values of the adult (to the extent that they can be 
ascertained) and the views of the family. Sometimes these other factors have been 
assigned weight as criteria independent from responsible medical opinion,139 although 
at other times they have been taken into account as part of making an informed 
medical decision.140
More recently, there has been a shift for an adult’s “best interests” to be informed 
more by non medical considerations than had been the case in the past.141 Criticisms 
are still made, however, that undue weight is given to the medical aspects of a 
person’s best interests142 and it has been suggested that doctors are unlikely to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures unless they conclude that it is 
                                           
137  Of course, if there is an application before the court about the matter, that court is the appropriate 
decision maker: see Part 2 above. 
138  This “best interests” test has been adopted widely in the common law world. The seminal English 
decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 has already been discussed in Part 2, 
although note also proposals to enact a version of the best interests test in statute: Mental 
Incapacity Bill 2004, cl 4. Best interests is also the test in New Zealand (Auckland Area Health 
Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235; Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201) and Ireland (In the 
Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401). 
139  For example, Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201, 210-212. See also Re G (Persistent Vegetative State)
[1995] 2 FCR 46 (Fam Div) 46, 51 in relation to the views of the family, although cf the comments 
of I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 2000) 2141. 
140 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 871 (Lord Goff); Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 250-251. 
141  See, for example, the often quoted statement by Butler-Sloss P in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 
1 FLR 549, 555: “best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare issues.” 
142  For example, some commentators have criticised the best interests test as being “medicalised” (JK 
Mason, RA McCall Smith and GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (6th ed, 2002) 513-514) while 
others are critical of the paternalism (which they describe as “doctor knows best”) as being 
“endemic in English medical law” (I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 2000) 2105). 
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medically appropriate to do so. This means that decisions made to continue or 
commence life-sustaining measures may be contrary to the likely wishes of the adult 
and the opinions of his or her family. 
Accordingly, under the common law, the decision would be made by Dr Efat in case 
study R, although he would consider the views of Ruth and her children. It is likely, 
however, that his decision would be to continue PEG feeding until Ruth’s situation 
has settled. 
9.3 The PAA and GAA
The regime established under the PAA and the GAA makes two major changes to how 
these decisions were made at common law, the first being who makes the decision. 
Instead of the decision resting with the treating doctor, section 66 of the GAA sets out 
(in order) another set of potential decision makers:143
x the adult (through an AHD); 
x a guardian appointed by the Tribunal, or the Tribunal itself through an order; 
x an attorney appointed under an enduring power of attorney or an AHD; or 
x a “statutory health attorney”. 
Such an approach departs from the common law as it is clear than none of these 
potential decision makers is the treating doctor. 
The second major change made by the legislation is the criteria upon which the 
decision maker must decide. At common law, a patient’s best interests govern 
whether life-sustaining measures are withheld or withdrawn. A medical assessment of 
a patient’s best interests, albeit informed by non medical factors, has tended to be the 
primary consideration taken into account. Under the PAA and GAA, decision makers 
must apply the general principles and the health care principle which include a wide 
array of factors, one of which is a patient’s best interests. How these principles 
interact is discussed below in Issue 10. 
So rather than Dr Efat making a decision based on Ruth’s best interests, under the 
PAA and GAA, Jim as Ruth’s attorney will be the appropriate decision maker and he 
will be required to apply the general principles and the health care principle. 
However, the issue raised here is that the legislation also provides for a further role 
for the adult’s health provider. Section 66A of the GAA requires that before Jim’s 
consent can operate, Dr Efat must reasonably consider that the commencement or 
continuation of the PEG feeding would be inconsistent with good medical practice. In 
case study R, Dr Efat is not of this view and so Jim’s consent cannot operate.144
                                           
143  See Part 2 where this was considered in more detail. 
144  Although as mentioned earlier, it would be possible for Jim to approach the Guardianship and 
Administration Tribunal to determine the matter. 
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9.4 Reform issues 
The question raised here is whether it is appropriate for an adult’s health provider to 
be able to veto a decision made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures
under the legislation. Although the decision maker (who is Jim in our case study)
could seek to overcome the doctor’s objection by pursuing the matter further before 
the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal, this is a limit on the ability of a
decision maker, either appointed by the adult or by the legislation, to consent on 
behalf of the adult. 
There are competing considerations in having an adult’s health provider play such a
role. On one hand, the safeguard of good medical practice may be warranted to 
protect adults with impaired capacity from relatives who would withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining measures in inappropriate circumstances. On the other hand, a lesser 
role for an adult’s health provider might be justified by the fact that the legislation has 
deliberately moved away from a best interests test, which has been criticised for being 
too heavily driven by medical considerations rather than what the adult wants. 
Another criticism might be that it gives significant power to a single health provider 
to assess what he or she thinks is good medical practice.145 It could also be argued that 
there are already sufficient safeguards to deal with potential abuse. For example,
under the legislation an individual (such as a doctor, nurse or relative) who is 
concerned about the welfare of the adult can bring the matter before the Tribunal for 
its consideration. This is a safeguard to prevent relatives from making a decision 
based upon improper motives.
Q23: Should an adult’s health provider be able to prevent a decision maker’s
consent from operating if they are not satisfied that commencing or
continuing life-sustaining measures is inconsistent with good medical
practice?
Q23: Should an adult’s health provider be able to prevent a decision maker’s
consent from operating if they are not satisfied that commencing or
continuing life-sustaining measures is inconsistent with good medical
practice?
145 Although the requirement for Dr Efat to “reasonably consider” that view means that he cannot base 
his opinion on idiosyncratic factors. Rather he must have reached his conclusion based on an
informed assessment, including consulting colleagues, guidelines or other literature if appropriate.
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Issue 10 – General principles and the health care 
principle: a need for further guidance?
10.1 The Problem 
The PAA and GAA provide substitute decision makers with principles that they must 
consider when exercising a power conferred on them by the legislation.146 These 
principles are contained in Schedule 1. They are separated into “general principles” 
and the “health care principle”. The general principles apply to all decisions made 
under the legislation, of which withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures 
is just one, and so are necessarily broad. The health care principle is relevant to health 
related decisions only, which obviously includes the sorts of decisions being 
discussed.
The principles are intended to provide guidance to a person or entity who is making a 
decision for an adult, for example, whether to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining 
measure. However, a decision maker may have difficulty deciding upon the 
appropriate course of action if the different principles that must be considered suggest 
conflicting outcomes. 
Case study S illustrates this issue. 
Case study S 
Trevor is a 40 year old man who is married with two young children. He is a high 
school physical education teacher and also competes in marathons. Trevor has been 
training for the 2006 Commonwealth Games. He and his wife have discussed each of 
their wishes should either be involved in an accident which would require invasive 
medical treatment to recover. They pledged to each other that they would ensure that 
the other would never have to incur what they perceived to be the unacceptable 
indignity of being on life-sustaining measures if there was only a limited prospect of 
making a full recovery. 
Trevor’s family is involved in a car accident. Most of the family escapes serious 
injury but Trevor sustains severe head injuries and is placed on life-support. Trevor’s 
wife, Amanda, is advised of his condition – that he has suffered significant brain 
damage, cannot currently breathe on his own and that he will need to be on life-
support until his condition stabilises and staff can more accurately assess his 
prognosis. At this stage, however, the prospect of Trevor ever being able to live 
independently again is extremely remote. 
                                           
146 PAA, s 76; GAA s 11. 
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10.2 Guidance provided by general principles (“GP”) and health 
care principle (“HCP”) 
The provision of principles to guide decision making as currently drafted in the 
legislation raises a number of issues. 
Principles provide uncertain and potentially conflicting guidance 
The principles that are likely to be particularly relevant to a decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures are: 
x An adult’s right to respect for his or her human worth and dignity as an 
individual must be recognised and taken into account;147
x The principle of substituted judgment must be used so that if, from an adult’s 
previous actions, it is reasonably practicable to work out what his or her views 
and wishes would be, a person in performing a function or exercising a power 
under the legislation must take those views and wishes into account;148
x A power for a health matter should be exercised in the way that is least 
restrictive of an adult’s rights;149
x A power for a health matter should only be exercised if – 
o It is necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote an adult’s health or 
wellbeing;150 or 
o It is, in all the circumstances, in an adult’s best interests.151
Other principles that may also be relevant (although possibly less directly) are: 
x An adult has the same basic human rights regardless of their capacity and this 
must be recognised and taken into account.152 This could refer to an adult’s 
ability to determine whether they want or do not want particular treatment; 
x A power for a matter should be exercised in a way that is appropriate to an 
adult’s characteristics and needs.153
The decision made, guided by these principles, will depend heavily on the 
circumstances of each case. In our case study, a number of these principles 
(particularly the principle of substituted judgment) suggest that the life-support should 
be terminated immediately. On the other hand, medical opinion suggests that life-
support should continue until Trevor’s condition stabilises and an assessment can be 
                                           
147  GP 3. 
148  GP 7(4). But note that in performing a function or exercising a power under the legislation, a 
person must do so in a way consistent with the adult’s proper care and protection: GP 7(5). 
149  HCP 12(1)(a). 
150  HCP 12(1)(b)(i). In deciding whether the exercise of a power is appropriate, a person must 
consider the adult’s views and wishes, and the information given by the adult’s health provider: 
HCP 12(2). 
151  HCP 12(1)(b)(ii). 
152  GP 2. 
153  GP 10. 
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made of his prognosis. The legislation gives no guidance as to which of these 
principles should take precedence. 
Relevance of adult’s views and wishes within the health care 
principle154
Under health care principle 12, one factor that a decision maker must consider is that 
a power for a health matter should be exercised only if: 
x it is necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote the adult’s health or 
wellbeing; or
x in all the circumstances, it is in the adult’s best interests (emphasis added). 
The use of the word “or” means that only one of these requirements needs to be 
satisfied. In determining whether the power is “appropriate” within (i), the decision 
maker is directed to seek the adult’s views and wishes.155 Although a contrary 
argument has been put forward,156 the legislation does not impose the same 
requirement in determining whether the exercise of the power would be “in the 
patient’s best interests”.157
It is suggested that the legislation should be altered to make clear that an adult’s views 
and wishes must be considered as part of assessing his or her best interests. It may 
already be the case, as the law is currently drafted, that an adult’s views and wishes 
should be considered when assessing best interests. This is because at common law, 
the determination of best interests should include considering what an adult wants (or 
would have wanted).158 Nevertheless, a change in legislation might still be warranted 
to strengthen the weight given to an adult’s views and wishes in that a legislative duty 
is imposed upon a decision maker to specifically seek this information. An 
amendment also seems logical in that there seems to be no justification for 
considering the adult’s views and wishes in determining whether treatment is 
“necessary and appropriate” but not when making an assessment as to “best interests”.  
10.3 Reform issues 
The preceding commentary raises three issues that may require further consideration. 
                                           
154  An argument similar to that outlined below, can also be made in relation to the requirement, which 
is also imposed under HCP 12(2), to “take the information given by the adult’s health provider into 
account”. This parallel argument is not pursued further here, partly because the views of an adult’s 
health provider are already so strongly entrenched as part of the best interests test that there is no 
need to reaffirm their relevance to an assessment of best interests. 
155  HCP 12(2). 
156  That argument suggests that HCP 12(2) applies to both HCP 12(1)(b)(i) and (ii). It argues that the 
use of the word “appropriate” in HCP 12(2) is coincidental and does not refer to the use of the 
same word in the previous subsection. 
157  This interpretation of the legislation is supported by the fact that HCP 12(1)(b)(ii) was inserted by 
a later amendment (the Guardianship and Administration and Other Acts Amendment Act 2001 
(Qld)). This argument is not explored further here but is outlined in greater detail in L Willmott 
and B White, “Charting a Course Through Difficult Legislative Waters: Tribunal Decisions on 
Life-Sustaining Measures” (2005) Journal of Law and Medicine (forthcoming). 
158  See the above discussion of the content of the best interests test in Issue 9 and also in Part 2.
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The first issue is whether clearer guidance is required concerning a decision about
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures. When considering a health 
matter involving such a decision, many (if not most) of the general principles will not
be relevant. If that is the case, perhaps consideration should be given to whether only
the health care principle should guide decision making. Another alternative is to 
continue to apply the general principles to these decisions, but state that they should 
yield to the health care principle in case of conflict.159
Secondly, even if only the health care principle governed such decision making, there
may need to be further guidance regarding priority given to those factors within this 
principle. If there is potential for conflict as outlined earlier, it should be considered 
whether the health care principle (or another provision) should contain a direction 
that, for example, the best interests test should prevail over a substituted judgment test 
(or vice versa). 
Thirdly, it is difficult to understand the way in which the health care principle treats
an adult’s views and wishes. There does not appear to be any justification for 
requiring an adult’s views and wishes to be taken into account in determining whether
the treatment is “necessary and appropriate”, but not impose a similar duty if making
a decision based on the alternate ground of “best interests”.
Q24: Should both the general principles and the health care principle, or just the
health care principle, guide decision making in relation to withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures?
Q25: Should more direction be given to a decision maker regarding which
principle (or principles) are more important in making a decision about
withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure if those principles
suggest different outcomes?
Q26: Should the legislation provide that the adult’s views and wishes apply
equally in determining “best interests” as in determining what treatment is
“necessary and appropriate” in the health care principle?
Q24: Should both the general principles and the health care principle, or just the
health care principle, guide decision making in relation to withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures?
Q25: Should more direction be given to a decision maker regarding which
principle (or principles) are more important in making a decision about
withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure if those principles
suggest different outcomes?
Q26: Should the legislation provide that the adult’s views and wishes apply
equally in determining “best interests” as in determining what treatment is
“necessary and appropriate” in the health care principle?
159 This is probably already the law because the specific provision dealing with health care is likely to
take priority over the more general provisions that apply to decision making in general.
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Issue 11 – A requirement to provide futile treatment?
11.1 The problem 
At common law, a health provider does not have an obligation to provide life-
sustaining measures that are futile.160 This is because receiving treatment that is futile 
is not in an adult’s best interests. Under the PAA and the GAA, a decision to withhold 
or withdraw life-sustaining measures requires consent so it may be more difficult for a 
health provider to refuse to provide futile treatment in Queensland. 
Case studies T, U and V illustrate the issue. 
Case study T 
James is 35 years old, single and a senior associate in a big law firm. He is the only 
child of Rupert and Charlotte. He has been involved in a car accident and suffered 
severe and irreversible brain damage. He was rushed to hospital and immediately put 
on life support as he had stopped breathing. Two weeks later his position has 
stabilised but he has no prospect of recovery. The medical staff at the hospital wants 
to stop the life support as they regard the treatment as futile. This prognosis has been 
supported by two independent consultants who have assessed James’ case. Rupert 
and Charlotte refuse to consent to withdrawal of treatment. 
Case study U 
Frances is 95 years old and very ill. She is suffering from end stage dementia, and has 
a number of other medical conditions including cerebral lymphoma, diverticulitis and 
osteoporosis. Frances’ condition has just deteriorated and she has been taken by 
ambulance from her nursing home to a hospital. Frances is diagnosed with 
pneumonia. The treatment proposed by her doctor, Dr Wells, is that Frances be made 
comfortable and be treated for her pain. Dr Wells has not prescribed antibiotics as he 
regards this treatment as futile. This course of action is consistent with good medical 
practice. Frances’ family is insisting that antibiotics be given to her. 
                                           
160  Determining when treatment is futile is an extremely difficult exercise and is not considered 
further in this Issues Paper. For a discussion of this problem, see I Kerridge, K Mitchell and J 
McPhee, “Defining Medical Futility in Ethics, Law and Clinical Practice: An Exercise in Futility?” 
(1997) 4 Journal of Law and Medicine 235. 
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Case study V 
Anne is a 40 year old woman who has been admitted to hospital for a minor 
procedure. An adverse event occurs regarding her anaesthetic and Anne suffers 
severe and irreversible brain damage. Although she is not clinically dead, there is 
only minimal core brain activity. Her breathing is laboured and it is likely that she 
will have to be put on a respirator (and certainly other life-sustaining measures) to 
survive.
Anne’s family is told that she has no prospect of recovery and that life-sustaining 
measures should not be provided to her. Anne’s family do not agree with this 
approach and insist that all life-sustaining measures be given as needed. 
11.2 The common law 
At common law, a medical practitioner is under no duty to treat a patient where “no 
benefit at all would be conferred…”.161 Treatment that is futile is not in a patient’s 
best interests and so need not be provided. This decision is going to be made at the 
first instance by the treating doctor in charge of the patient who must make an 
assessment of his or her best interests.162
It is, of course, open to those who are close to the patient to challenge that the 
treatment is futile and to assert instead that a patient’s best interests warrant that 
treatment.163 If a court is called upon to adjudicate in such a dispute, it is not bound by 
the views of the medical profession and will reach its own independent assessment of 
what the patient’s best interests require.164  However, the courts have said, in the 
context of futility, that the “decision as to appropriate treatment … is principally a 
matter for the expertise of professional medical practitioners”.165 Again, if the court 
concludes (as the doctor did) that the treatment is futile and therefore not in a patient’s 
best interests, that treatment need not be continued.166
In all three case studies, then, the common law would allow the medical staff to 
withdraw treatment because in each case, the treatment – whether existing or 
proposed – is apparently futile. In case study T, the medical team may withdraw life 
support. In case studies U and V, the treating doctors may refuse to administer life-
                                           
161 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 858-859 (Lord Keith of Kinkel), 869 (Lord Goff of 
Chieveley), 884-885 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 898 (Lord Mustill). See also Auckland Area 
Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 251 and the recent Australian decision 
Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061. 
162 Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549, 554. 
163  This is what happened in Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 
549 and in Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061. 
164  This can be contrasted with the position in England where it appears that more weight is given to 
the views of medical profession: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 858-859 (Lord Keith 
of Kinkel), citing Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. See also 
Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 614. 
165  See Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061, [25]. 
166 Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061, [28]. 
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sustaining measures. It may be that the family objections result in the matter being 
decided by a court in which case, provided the medical evidence supports the action 
proposed by the treating doctor, the judge is likely to reach the same conclusion as to 
futility and best interests. 
11.3 The PAA and GAA
The extent to which futile treatment must be provided is a little more complex under 
the PAA and GAA. The following issues are relevant: 
x Section 79 of the GAA makes it an offence for a health provider to carry out 
health care for an adult with impaired capacity unless the appropriate consent 
is obtained. 
x “Health care” is defined to include the withholding or withdrawal of a life-
sustaining measure if its commencement or continuation would be inconsistent 
with good medical practice.167
x A “health matter” is a matter relating to “health care”168 and section 66 of the 
GAA sets out who can make the decision about a health matter on behalf of an 
adult with impaired capacity. (This section would be relevant for case studies 
T, U and V above and in each case, the consent to withhold or withdraw 
treatment would need to be given by the decision maker empowered by the 
legislation. In these case studies, that decision maker will be a member of the 
adults’ family, not the treating doctor.) 
The conclusion from this is that a health provider must obtain consent for a decision 
to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, or he or she will commit an 
offence under s 79 of the GAA.
This causes a problem for the health providers in case studies T, U and V. The 
necessary consent is being withheld by the substitute decision makers (the family 
members) so the health providers would be unable to withdraw the treatment in case 
study T, and may be required to provide the antibiotics in case study U and the life 
support in case study V. On this interpretation, the health providers would be 
compelled to provide futile treatment, which is a significant shift from the common 
law.
There are, however, two ways in which this difficulty can be avoided. The first is for 
the Adult Guardian to give consent on behalf of the adult. The GAA authorises the 
Adult Guardian to do this in cases where there is disagreement about a health matter 
that cannot be resolved through mediation169 or where a decision maker is acting 
contrary to the health care principle.170 The second potential way to avoid this 
                                           
167 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5(2). The difficulty with this definition (particularly the reference to good 
medical practice) is dealt with in Issue 12. 
168 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 4. 
169 GAA, s 42. 
170 GAA, s 43. 
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difficulty is for the matter to be brought before the Tribunal, which can also consent 
on behalf of an adult with impaired capacity.171
11.4 Reform issues 
The outcome of the above reasoning is that there may be two reasons to consider
reform. The first is that a health provider who withholds or withdraws life-sustaining 
measures may still commit an offence even if a court or Tribunal subsequently 
determines that the treatment was futile. Because the lawfulness of a decision turns on 
consent rather than best interests (and futility), if that consent not to provide the
treatment was not obtained, an offence under s 79 of the GAA has been committed.
This is regardless of the appropriateness of the treatment.
This is different from the common law. Although in cases of disagreement it may be
prudent to seek the guidance of a court, at common law a doctor who does not will 
only be liable for a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment if subsequent
prosecution or civil litigation shows the doctor’s assessment of futility has been
wrong.
A second reason to consider reform is that it requires a health provider, in the case of 
a disagreement, to go through an additional procedural hurdle of seeking consent 
either from the Adult Guardian or the Tribunal. There may be an argument for 
requiring external approval of a medical decision in some circumstances where a
decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment is in dispute. However, if
the proposed or current treatment is clearly futile, it is perhaps inappropriate to insist
on this additional requirement.
Q27: Should health providers be required to obtain consent from a substitute
decision maker before they can withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
measures that are medically futile?
Q27: Should health providers be required to obtain consent from a substitute
decision maker before they can withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
measures that are medically futile?
171 GAA, s 82(1)(f).
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Issue 12 – “Health care”: a problematic definition
12.1 The problem 
Under Queensland’s legislative regime, some decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures can only be taken if commencing or continuing the treatment 
would be inconsistent with good medical practice. For example, as discussed in Part 
2, decisions made by statutory health attorneys must meet this requirement before 
they can take effect.172 On the other hand, AHDs (apart from directions to withhold or 
withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration) can operate without regard to good 
medical practice. Presumably, because the decision is actually being made by the 
adult him or herself rather than another on their behalf, the legislation gives effect to 
the right to self-determination. 
A problem arises, however, in the PAA and GAA regarding the definition of “health 
care”. “Health care” includes withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures if
commencing or continuing such treatment would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice.173 Defining “health care” in this way raises two potential interpretations, 
both of which are unsatisfactory: 
x The most likely interpretation is that the definition may mean that a decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, where commencing or 
continuing this treatment is not inconsistent with good medical practice, is not 
a decision about an adult’s “health care”, and so falls outside the legislation 
altogether.174 This would mean that such a decision could not be authorised by 
the legislation. 
x An alternative, although less plausible, interpretation is that the definition may 
mean that a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, where 
commencing or continuing this treatment is not inconsistent with good 
medical practice, is not a decision about an adult’s “health care”, but rather a 
“personal matter”.175
Case studies W and X illustrate the problems that this definition can cause. 
                                           
172 GAA, s 66A. 
173 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5. 
174  Unfortunately, for this sentence to be legally accurate, the wording is difficult to follow. In 
essence, the point being made is that “health care” includes a decision to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining measures only if it is consistent with good medical practice to do so. 
175  Again, the legislation makes expressing this point clearly quite difficult. In essence, the point being 
made is that a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures that is not consistent with 
good medical practice will be a “personal matter” and not “health care”. 
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Case study W 
Katarina is terminally ill with cancer and is expected to die within a year. When she 
was first diagnosed with this illness, she executed a valid AHD which states that she 
does not want life-sustaining measures, including antibiotics. More recently, Katarina 
has also developed dementia with the result that although she still has some 
awareness of her surroundings, for example, she still recognises people, she does not 
have capacity to make her own medical decisions. 
Katarina has been receiving some palliative chemotherapy and recently she 
developed an infection at the point at which the medication was being administered. 
Her immune system is such that if the infection is left without treatment, it is highly 
likely that she will die. However, the infection can be treated cheaply and easily by 
common antibiotics. Dr Godfrey is aware of the AHD but decides that treatment is 
likely to resolve her immediate condition and so orders that the antibiotics should be 
given.
Case study X 
Assume the same factual scenario, except instead of an AHD, Katarina had executed 
a power of attorney for personal matters in favour of Abdul. Katarina and Abdul had 
discussed at length Katarina’s views on the sorts of medical treatment she wants and 
does not want. She was of the view that even if her life is still comfortable, she does 
not want to linger forever. Accordingly, in one of these discussions, Katarina told 
Abdul that regardless of what the doctors might say, she does not want to receive 
medical treatment needed to keep her alive if she gets that ill “because her body 
knows when it is time to go”. 
12.2 Decision is a personal matter only 
The less likely of the two interpretations (second bullet point above) is that the 
definition of “health care” may lead to the absurd result that a decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures is not regarded as a decision about a health matter, 
but rather about a personal matter. This would mean that in case study W, because the 
decision is not a health matter, it cannot be governed by Katarina’s AHD.176 The 
position is different though in case study X where Abdul has been given a power of 
attorney for personal matters. His refusal of the antibiotics on behalf of Katarina is 
contrary to medical advice, so it could not be a health matter. It could, however, be a 
decision about the adult’s “care” and so potentially be considered a personal matter.177
If this was so, he could therefore make the decision to withhold antibiotics under his 
power of attorney for personal matters.  
                                           
176 PAA, s 35(1). 
177 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 2. 
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Such an interpretation is clearly undesirable and would also have a number of other 
absurd results including: 
x A statutory health attorney could not make such a decision as they are unable 
to make personal decisions. 
x The health care principle could not apply (even though it is arguably the most 
important principle to consider for health issues) because it applies only to 
health matters. 
x There would be fewer safeguards for more controversial and difficult 
decisions. This arises because a decision to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures only becomes a personal matter if the commencement or 
continuation of the treatment is not inconsistent with good medical practice. 
Arguably, these are the sorts of cases where there should be stricter criteria for 
when treatment should not be given. However, the effect of becoming a 
personal matter is that there are fewer safeguards. One example is that 
decisions about personal matters do not need to take account of whether or not 
they are inconsistent with good medical practice. 
Although such an interpretation is open to the Tribunal and to the courts, its absurdity 
means that they will probably avoid taking such an approach. 
12.3 Decision falls outside legislation 
The more plausible interpretation (but one that is still problematic) discussed above 
was that a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures can only be 
health care if commencing or continuing the treatment would be inconsistent with 
good medical practice. Accordingly, if such a decision is not, then it is not “health 
care”. Under this interpretation, the alternative view of treating such a decision as 
being a personal matter is rejected because it is so clearly and obviously a decision 
about an adult’s health. Rather, it must have been the intention of the legislature that if 
such a decision did not fall within the definition of “health care”, it is not one that is 
capable of being made under the legislation. In short, this means that health care 
decisions in this area, whether made pursuant to an AHD or by a substituted decision 
maker, can only be made if they are not inconsistent with good medical practice. 
In case study W, the direction in Katarina’s AHD could not operate unless it complied 
with the good medical practice requirement, because it is not health care as regulated 
by the legislation. It is difficult to reconcile this with s 36(2)(b) of the PAA which 
imposes this requirement of good medical practice only in relation to directions in 
AHDs that relate to artificial nutrition and hydration. It would seem illogical for 
Parliament to have included this specific safeguard that applies only to artificial 
nutrition and hydration, but then render it obsolete by defining health care so as to 
require all medical treatment given to comply with the good medical practice 
requirement. Perhaps the answer to this lies with the fact that the definition of health 
care was amended in 2001.178 It seems that in making these changes, Parliament has 
unintentionally created this inconsistency. 
                                           
178 Guardianship and Administration and Other Acts Amendment Act 2001 (Qld), s 17. 
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In case study X, Abdul would be unable to make this decision if it is inconsistent with 
good medical practice because it is not a health matter. Again, it seems unlikely that 
such a result was intended because it leaves no room for the operation of s 66A of the
GAA which already imposes this requirement of good medical practice. 
Q28: Should the definition of “health care” in sch 2 s 5(2) of the PAA and GAA
retain the requirement that commencing or continuing life-sustaining
measures be inconsistent with good medical practice?
Q28: Should the definition of “health care” in sch 2 s 5(2) of the PAA and GAA
retain the requirement that commencing or continuing life-sustaining
measures be inconsistent with good medical practice?
77 Rethinking Li fe-Sustaining Measures
Issue 13 – “Life-sustaining measure”: too narrow a 
definition?179
13.1 The problem 
The PAA and GAA treat decisions to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining measures 
differently from other kinds of health care. This is because of the grave consequences 
of such decisions. However, it may be that at least one kind of treatment needed to 
keep a person alive, the hand feeding of patients who are unable to feed themselves, 
does not fall within the definition of “life-sustaining measure”. This means that a 
decision to cease such treatment is not subject to the same scrutiny as is the case for 
similar life-sustaining measures such as artificial nutrition and hydration. 
Case studies Y and Z illustrate this issue. 
Case study Y 
Helga is 80 years old and, since suffering a stroke 12 months ago, has been in a 
persistent vegetative state (“PVS”). Despite this diagnosis, Helga is still able to 
swallow. The nursing staff of the aged care facility in which she lives hand feed her 
all of her meals. 
Helga’s daughter is her statutory health attorney and asks the nursing staff to stop 
feeding her mother. Helga’s doctor, Dr Khan considers that continuing the hand 
feeding is not inconsistent with good medical practice, so instructs the nurses to 
continue feeding Helga. 
Case study Z 
David is 65 years old and he suffers from advanced dementia.  While he is still 
mobile, he lacks capacity to make medical decisions.  David has been fed by hand at 
his nursing home since his admission some years ago.  His condition has deteriorated 
recently, and he no longer shows any interest in being fed.  The food that does go in 
his mouth is not chewed and simply remains there until he later spits it out. 
David’s wife (his statutory health attorney) requests that David should no longer 
receive food, and that no artificial nutrition or hydration should be provided.  She has 
been informed that the medical evidence shows that David’s passing will be more 
comfortable if this approach is taken.  However, David’s treating doctor, Dr 
Millhouse, does not believe that this approach is consistent with good medical 
practice and wants to provide nutrition and hydration artificially. 
                                           
179  This issue was identified by Associate Professor Mal Parker during discussions after the public 
lecture “Lawful Withdrawal” held at QUT on 7 July 2004. 
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Before turning to the Queensland legislation in some detail, a preliminary comment is 
to distinguish the recent Victorian Supreme Court case of Gardner; re BWV180 from 
the issue being considered here. Although both involve a comparison of artificially or 
naturally feeding and hydrating, the Victorian decision is of limited relevance in 
Queensland. In Gardner; re BWV, the court determined that artificial nutrition and 
hydration could be refused by a guardian as it was “medical treatment” rather than 
“palliative care” as both terms are defined by the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic).
However, that decision does not help ascertain the state of Queensland law because 
the Victorian Act uses different terminology (with different definitions). Further, the 
issue being considered here, whether hand feeding of a patient who is incapable of 
feeding themselves falls with the definition of a “life-sustaining measure”, is different 
from the point in question in that case. 
13.2 Life-sustaining measures and hand feeding 
Whether treatment being provided to an individual falls within the definition of “life-
sustaining measures” matters because of section 66A of the GAA. It provides that such 
treatment may only be withheld or withdrawn (apart from as requested in an AHD)181
if its commencement or continuation is inconsistent with good medical practice. The 
rationale for this section is that it imposes an additional safeguard for such a serious 
health decision. 
The definition of “life-sustaining measure” is as follows:182
5A Life-sustaining measure  
(1) A "life-sustaining measure" is health care intended to sustain or prolong life and that 
supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily functions that are temporarily or 
permanently incapable of independent operation.  
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), each of the following is a "life-sustaining measure" –  
(a) cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
(b) assisted ventilation;  
(c) artificial nutrition and hydration.  
(3) A blood transfusion is not a "life-sustaining measure".  
The issue, then, is whether hand feeding is a “life-sustaining measure”.  Artificial
nutrition is clearly a life-sustaining measure because it is listed as an example.183
However, it is also clear that such treatment would fall within the general definition.  
Artificial nutrition is “intended to sustain or prolong life” and the “vital bodily 
function” that is “temporarily or permanently incapable of independent operation” is 
the function of swallowing.  Artificial nutrition “supplants” that function.184
                                           
180 Gardner; re BWV [2003] VSC 173. 
181  Although note the exception for those directions relating to withholding or withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration: PAA, s 36(2)(b). 
182 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5A.
183 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5A(2)(c). 
184 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5A(1). 
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It seems, however, that the situation may be different with hand feeding because of 
doubts about whether such feeding supplants or maintains “vital bodily functions that 
are temporarily or permanently incapable of independent operation”.  Therefore, if 
hand feeding is not a life-sustaining measure, it would be regarded simply as health 
care. This sort of feeding would comfortably fall within the definition of that term as 
it is care provided under the direction or supervision of a health provider to maintain 
the adult’s physical condition.185
13.3 Outcomes
If hand feeding is not a life-sustaining measure and so is not subject to the limitation 
of good medical practice, Dr Khan would not be entitled to rely on that practice to 
insist that feeding continue. It is unlikely that such an outcome was intended. The fact 
that Helga can swallow her own food suggests that her condition may be better than 
others in a PVS, yet the law imposes fewer safeguards in this case and permits 
treatment to be withheld or withdrawn from her more easily. 
The same result ensues in case study Z, for the same reasons.  If feeding by hand is 
not a life-sustaining measure, Dr Millhouse’s opinion of good medical practice cannot 
operate as a veto. Accordingly, David’s wife may lawfully consent to the cessation of 
feeding. This second case study demonstrates that this issue may arise with patients 
who are engaging with the world around them to some extent and are some distance 
away from death. 
13.4 Reform issues 
One way around this problem might be to include a subsection in the definition of 
“life-sustaining measure” that specifically includes this sort of feeding. A second 
option is to revise the definition of life-sustaining measure, perhaps to a more 
functional test that focuses on whether withholding or withdrawing treatment is likely 
to result in the adult’s death. 
13.5 Difficult ethical issues 
The issue just discussed raises primarily the issue of how the legislation is drafted. It 
invites comment on whether the definition of “life-sustaining measure” is adequate 
given that it may not catch at least one scenario (a patient in a PVS who can swallow) 
which may be difficult to distinguish from another very similar scenario (a patient in a 
PVS being sustained artificially because he or she cannot swallow). 
This issue does, however, raise a wider range of ethical considerations, some of which 
will be briefly canvassed. This paper does not take a particular view on these matters 
but raises them for discussion. These matters are being specifically flagged because of 
the strong feedback received from the Advisory Group, many of whom had particular 
views about food and water, whether given naturally or artificially, at the end of life. 
                                           
185 PAA and GAA, sch 2 s 5. 
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One scenario proposed was a patient with impaired capacity who was refusing food 
and water. This raised issues of whether it should be given anyway (presumably with 
some level of coercion) or whether a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (a PEG, 
which is a tube through which artificial nutrition and hydration can be provided to the 
stomach) should be inserted. A third option was not to feed the patient on the grounds
that the refusal of food and water is an indicator that, for example in cases of severe
dementia, the terminal phase of the illness has begun. 
Another question asked was whether a patient who is in a PVS and who is still 
capable of swallowing, should continue to be fed. It has been suggested that hand 
feeding in a case such as this is a form of life support and that it should be capable of 
being withdrawn like any other form of intervention that merely prolongs life.186 The 
law is clear that those patients who are in this state do not need to be hydrated and 
nourished artificially so it was suggested that it is reasonable to ask whether their 
condition can be distinguished simply because food and water is taken naturally.
Another issue raised was the role of technology and whether its use (for example, a 
PEG) is a reasonable basis for determining what medical treatment need or need not
be given. 
As noted above, this paper does not seek to engage with these difficult ethical issues
at this early stage. Rather it raises them for consideration by the broader community, 
prompted mainly by the strength of views expressed from within the Advisory Group. 
However, as with any matter raised in this Issues Paper, comments on this issue are 
welcome.
Q29: Is there any reason in principle for differentiating between a PVS patient
who is being hand fed and a PVS patient who is being artificially provided
with nutrition and hydration in terms of the circumstances in which
treatment should cease?
Q30: Should the definition of a “life-sustaining measure” be modified to more
widely include those treatments needed to keep an adult alive?
Q29: Is there any reason in principle for differentiating between a PVS patient
who is being hand fed and a PVS patient who is being artificially provided
with nutrition and hydration in terms of the circumstances in which
treatment should cease?
Q30: Should the definition of a “life-sustaining measure” be modified to more
widely include those treatments needed to keep an adult alive?
186 See for example, J Abbey, “Helping or Hurting? Nurses as life-support in late-stage dementia” (3rd
Asia/Oceania Regional Congress of Gerontology, Hong Kong, 19-23 November 1995).
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Section 3 – Criminal Law Issues 
Section 3 addresses the interaction between the PAA and the GAA, and the Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld). Because withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures may 
result in a person dying, this raises the spectre of the criminal law. This section 
contains only one issue which explores the relationship between these two branches of 
law. There are concerns that the PAA and GAA might not operate to exclude all 
criminal responsibility for appropriate decisions made under the legislation. 
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Issue 14 – The Criminal Code and the PAA and GAA
14.1 The problem 
The Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) imposes liability on those involved in the death of a 
person if that death is judged to be an unlawful killing.187 Although the PAA and GAA
provide for the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining measures, the 
relationship between that legislation and the Criminal Code is unclear. It may be that 
this relationship needs to be clarified so that there can be no suggestion that health 
providers involved in withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures under the 
Queensland legislation could be liable under the Criminal Code for their actions. 
Case study AA illustrates this potential problem. 
Case study AA 
Dr Cavalaro is treating Reginald, a 90 year old man who is lying in hospital in a 
persistent vegetative state. He is being artificially nourished and hydrated and 
medical opinion is that Reginald will never recover. Dr Cavalaro withdraws the 
artificial nutrition and hydration in accordance with the legislative regime and 
Reginald subsequently dies. 
14.2 Criminal law and consent 
The concern here is that there is some uncertainty about whether Dr Cavalaro may 
have breached the Criminal Code. Section 285 of the Code imposes a duty on a health 
provider to provide a patient with the necessaries of life. If a health provider fails to 
provide such necessaries, he or she is deemed to have caused the death of the patient. 
If artificial nutrition and hydration is regarded as a necessary of life in case study AA, 
Dr Cavalaro may be regarded as having caused Reginald’s death. This raises a 
potential conflict between the criminal law, which may require continued treatment, 
and the consent mechanism created by the PAA and GAA which is designed to make 
appropriate decisions not to treat lawful. 
It is suggested that withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures should be 
lawful in appropriate circumstances and there are potentially two ways in which it 
could be argued that a decision under the PAA and GAA does not contravene the 
criminal law. The first draws on persuasive English legal authority188 that suggests 
that consent will operate to make such action lawful. Because treatment (here, the 
                                           
187 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 300. 
188 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 882-883 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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provision of life-sustaining measures) without consent is unlawful, there can be no 
duty to provide medical treatment where consent has not been given or where consent 
has been withdrawn. Therefore withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures,
where consent to receive that treatment has not been given, must be lawful. It is
probable that this is also the position under Queensland’s Criminal Code. Section 246 
creates the offence of assault, which would make treatment given without consent
unlawful.189 This result of this reasoning would be that consent to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures that is obtained under the PAA and GAA would
render the withholding or withdrawal lawful.190
An alternative argument would be that in appropriate circumstances, for example,
where it was no longer in a patient’s best interests to receive life-sustaining measures,
such treatment would not be regarded as a “necessary of life”.191 This would mean
that the duty to provide such treatment under the Criminal Code would not arise and 
therefore there is no criminal liability.
Although these are potential ways that criminal liability might be avoided, there are 
two complicating factors. The first is that s 284 of the Criminal Code provides that 
consent is not a defence to unlawful killing. This conflicts with s 246 and there may
be some doubts as to whether s 246 would prevail given that it is less specific than
s 284 and also earlier in the Act. The second complicating factor is that the PAA and
the GAA specifically provide that nothing in these Acts can authorise, justify or 
excuse killing a person and nor do they affect s 284 of the Criminal Code.192 The 
uncertainty about how these provisions of the PAA and GAA interact the Criminal
Code may mean that Dr Cavalaro is left open to prosecution. 
Q31: Should the PAA and GAA contain a provision that clarifies the relationship
between those Acts and the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) so as to avoid
concerns about potential criminal liability?
Q31: Should the PAA and GAA contain a provision that clarifies the relationship
between those Acts and the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) so as to avoid
concerns about potential criminal liability?
189 Note also s 79 of the GAA which provides that if a health provider treats an adult with impaired
capacity without consent, then he or she has committed an offence.
190 GAA, s 80.
191 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 249-250.
192 PAA, s 37; GAA, s 238.
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Issue 1 – Wider recognition of advance directives about health care 
Q1: Should the PAA and GAA recognise a valid common law advance directive as 
being binding on health providers? 
Q2: If you answered “yes” to Q1, should there be any limitations (like those 
discussed in Issue 2) on the extent to which a common law advance directive 
can operate? 
Issue 2 – Limits on the operation of advance health directives 
Q3:  Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the adult’s 
health is sufficiently poor such that it meets one of the conditions described in s 
36(2)(a) as set out above? 
Q4:  Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the adult 
does not have a reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make 
decisions about his or her health? 
Q5:  Should the condition discussed in Q4 (that the adult has no reasonable prospect 
of regaining capacity for health matters) be regarded as being met if the 
treatment that the AHD purports to refuse could enable the adult to recover that 
capacity? 
Q6:  Should the PAA continue to draw a distinction in AHDs between artificial 
nutrition and hydration and other kinds of life-sustaining measures by imposing 
a requirement of good medical practice on the former but not the latter? 
Issue 3 – Protection for health providers relying on invalid 
advance health directives 
Q7: Should the word “invalidity” as used in the context of an AHD in s 100 of the 
PAA be defined to clarify the circumstances in which the protection will apply? 
Q8:  Should protection in s 100 of the PAA depend on whether the health provider 
has “knowledge” of the invalidity (as is currently the case), or on whether the 
health provider was acting in “good faith with reasonable care and skill” in 
ascertaining the validity of the AHD? 
Issue 1 – Wider recognition of advance directives about health care 
Q1: Should the PAA and GAA recognise a valid common law advance directive as 
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discussed in Issue 2) on the extent to which a common law advance directive 
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36(2)(a) as set out above? 
Q4:  Should the PAA continue to require that AHDs cannot operate unless the adult 
does not have a reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make 
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Q5:  Should the condition discussed in Q4 (that the adult has no reasonable prospect 
of regaining capacity for health matters) be regarded as being met if the 
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a requirement of good medical practice on the former but not the latter? 
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Section 4 – Questions for Consideration: Summary 
   
This final section of Part 3 brings together the questions already posed so they are 
accessible in the one place. 
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Q9: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s “knowledge”
(as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be clarified in the
legislation?
Q10: If you answered “yes” to Q9, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)?
Issue 4 – Protection for health providers where no knowledge of 
advance health directives
Q11: Should protection in s 102 of the PAA depend on whether the health provider
has “knowledge” that the adult has an AHD (as is currently the case), or on
whether the health provider was acting in “good faith with reasonable care and
skill” in ascertaining whether an AHD exists?
Q12: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s “knowledge”
(as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be clarified in the
legislation?
Q13: If you answered “yes” to Q12, which of the following should “knowledge”
include:
(a) actual knowledge?
(b) imputed knowledge?
(c) wilful blindness?
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)?
Issue 5 – Deliberate non-compliance with advance health directives:
a statutory excuse?
Q14: Should health providers be able to not follow AHDs if they believe that the
directions in these documents are: 
(a) uncertain?
(b) inconsistent with good medical practice?
(c) inappropriate because circumstances have changed since the document
was executed?
Issue 6 – Proving copies of advance health directives
Q15: Would establishing a central register of AHDs be an appropriate way to resolve
concerns about the authenticity of these documents?  Please provide reasons for 
your view.
Q16: In the absence of a central register, should s 45 of the PAA be clarified to
explain how an enduring document may be proved in “another way”?
Q9: If you think that protection should depend on the health provider’s “knowledge”
(as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be clarified in the
legislation?
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(b) imputed knowledge?
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(c) wilful blindness?
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Issue 5 – Deliberate non-compliance with advance health directives:
a statutory excuse?
Q14: Should health providers be able to not follow AHDs if they believe that the
directions in these documents are: 
(a) uncertain?
(b) inconsistent with good medical practice?
(c) inappropriate because circumstances have changed since the document
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Issue 6 – Proving copies of advance health directives
Q15: Would establishing a central register of AHDs be an appropriate way to resolve
concerns about the authenticity of these documents?  Please provide reasons for 
your view.
Q16: In the absence of a central register, should s 45 of the PAA be clarified to
explain how an enduring document may be proved in “another way”?
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Q17:  If you answered “yes” to Q16, should the certification and other requirements 
imposed by s 45 of the PAA be relaxed so that a complete photocopy is 
sufficient to prove an enduring document? 
Issue 7 – Emergency treatment and advance health directives 
Q18:  Should protection in s 63(2) of the GAA depend on whether the health provider 
“knows” that the adult objects to the health care in an AHD (as is currently the 
case), or on whether the health provider was acting in “good faith and with 
reasonable care and skill” in ascertaining whether the adult objects to the health 
care in an AHD? 
Q19:  If you think that protection should depend on what the health provider “knows” 
(as is currently the case), should the meaning of the term be clarified in the 
legislation? 
Q20:  If you answered “yes” to Q19, should “know” include: 
(a) actual knowledge? 
(b) imputed knowledge?  
(c) wilful blindness? 
(d) other (if so, please elaborate)? 
Issue 8 – “Good medical practice”: what does it mean? 
Q21:  Should the test be reformulated so that it would be lawful to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures provided such a course is consistent with 
good medical practice? 
Q22:  Should guidelines be developed to assist health providers and substitute 
decision makers in making decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining measures? 
Issue 9 – “Good medical practice”: a right of veto? 
Q23:  Should an adult’s health provider be able to prevent a decision maker’s consent 
from operating if they are not satisfied that commencing or continuing life-
sustaining measures is inconsistent with good medical practice? 
Issue 10 – General principles and the health care principle: 
a need for further guidance? 
Q24:  Should both the general principles and the health care principle, or just the 
health care principle, guide decision making in relation to withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures? 
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sustaining measures is inconsistent with good medical practice? 
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Q25: Should more direction be given to a decision maker regarding which principle
(or principles) are more important in making a decision about withholding or
withdrawing a life-sustaining measure if those principles suggest different
outcomes?
Q26: Should the legislation provide that the adult’s views and wishes apply equally in
determining “best interests” as in determining what treatment is “necessary and
appropriate” in the health care principle?
Issue 11 – A requirement to provide futile treatment?
Q27: Should health providers be required to obtain consent from a substitute decision
maker before they can withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures that are
medically futile?
Issue 12 – “Health care”: a problematic definition
Q28: Should the definition of “health care” in sch 2 s 5(2) of the PAA and GAA retain
the requirement that commencing or continuing life-sustaining measures be 
inconsistent with good medical practice?
Issue 13 – “Life-sustaining measure”: too narrow a definition?
Q29: Is there any reason in principle for differentiating between a PVS patient who is 
being hand fed and a PVS patient who is being artificially provided with
nutrition and hydration in terms of the circumstances in which treatment should
cease?
Q30: Should the definition of a “life-sustaining measure” be modified to more widely
include those treatments needed to keep an adult alive?
Issue 14 – The Criminal Code and the PAA and GAA
Q31: Should the PAA and GAA contain a provision that clarifies the relationship
between those Acts and the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) so as to avoid concerns
about potential criminal liability?
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